Aboriginal Rights in Canada and the United States by Mickenberg, Neil H.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 9, Number 1 (August 1971) Article 3
Aboriginal Rights in Canada and the United States
Neil H. Mickenberg
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Mickenberg, Neil H.. "Aboriginal Rights in Canada and the United States." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 9.1 (1971) : 119-156.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol9/iss1/3
ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN CANADA
AND THE UNITED STATES
NEIL H. MICKENBERG*
They made us many promises, more than I can
remember, but they never kept but one: they
promised to take our land, and they took it.
Anonymous Indian.'
I INTRODUCTION
The controversy following the Canadian government's issuance of The
White Paper on Indian Affairs,2 combined with the universally rising con-
sciousness and militancy amongst oppressed people,3 has once again focused
attention upon the seemingly eternal and unabating plight of native peoples
in North America.4
In Canada, much of the rhetoric has concerned itself with the interpre-
tation and practical viability of aboriginal rights.5 "Aboriginal rights"6 refers
to those property rights which inure to native people (Indians and Eskimos)
by virtue of their occupation upon certain lands from time immemorial. The
recognition and enforcement of such rights have been matters of hot dispute
and protracted litigation both in Canada and the United States.7 While it
*Teaching Fellow, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1970-71.
1 Newsweek, February 1, 1971 at 69, rev'g D. Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded
Knee (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).2 Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Statement of the
Government of Canada on Indian Policy (1969).
3 The most spectacular example of Indian militancy has been the occu-
pation of Alcatraz in California. Perusal of the monthly publication Akwesasne Notes
(Rooseveltown, New York) which consists of reprinted news stories about native
peoples in North and South America, will reveal that Alcatraz is but one of many
similarly assertive acts.
4 Several notable books have recently been published in Canada and the United
States which concern themselves with the so-called "Indian-problem". See, e.g., Indian-
Eskimo Assoc. of Canada, Native Rights in Canada (Toronto: 1970); H. Cardinal, The
Unjust Society: The Tragedy of Canada's Indians (Edmonton: M. G. Hurtig Ltd.,
1969); Our Brothers Keeper: The Indian in White America, E. Calm (ed.), (Washing-
ton D.C.: New Community Press, 1969); V. Deloria, Jr., Custer Died For Your Sins
(London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1969).
5 Compare remarks of Prime Minister Trudeau at an August 8, 1969 speech in
Vancouver, British Columbia, reprinted in Native Rights in Canada, supra note 4, at
Appendix 8, with views of H. Cardinal, supra note 4 at 29;
6 Throughout this article, the term "aboriginal rights" is used interchangeably with
the terms "original Indian title", "Indian title" and "aboriginal title".
7See, e.g., Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia (1971), 13 D.L.R. (3d)
64, (1970), 74 W.W.R. 481 (B.C.C.A.); United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks
(1946), 329 U.S. 40. Unlike Canada, the United States has made the political decision
to compensate for the loss of aboriginal rights in appropriate cases. The enabling legis-
lation is the Indian Claims Comm'n Act, 25 U.S.C. §70 (1964). See Otoe and Mis-
souria Tribe of Indians v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 265 (Ct. Cl. 1955), cert. denied,
(1955), 350 U.S. 848.
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may be too much to hope that Canadian courts will order compensation for
the infringement of aboriginal title without a legislative direction to that
effect,8 judicial cognizance of aboriginal title, a considered study of its quali-
ties, and a frank recognition that government has failed to live up to its legal
and moral obligations, is a real possibility and would undoubtedly hasten a
political solution of this unhappy problem.9 It is thus suggested that while a
favorable outcome for native claims may ultimately be determined by the
legislature, aggressive litigation should by no means be foreclosed as a
method of attaining recognition of aboriginal rights. Only a most insensitive
political leadership could refuse to rectify grievances in the face of judicial
declarations that such grievances are just and outstanding.
It is assumed that the issue of aboriginal rights will be increasingly
litigated in Canada.10 While much of the aboriginal land question in Canada
has been peacefully settled through treaties with the Indians, few if any
treaties have been concluded in British Columbia, Quebec, the Yukon and
much of the Northwest Territories." Whatever land rights native people
have in these latter areas will depend upon the treatment accorded the theory
of aboriginal rights in the courts and legislatures. A study of the juris-
prudence surrounding the question of native rights therefore seems both
timely and appropriate. Moreover, unlike other areas of Canadian law which
have developed quite independently of American influence, the peculiarities
of the law of aboriginal rights will undoubtedly cause a certain reference to
American case law in the future. There are several reasons for this. The
histories of Canada and the United States are substantially entwined during
the period in which the doctrine of aboriginal rights was being developed.' 2
Further, the pattern of dealing with native peoples has, in many respects,
been quite similar in both countries.13 Most important, the Canadian and
American jurisprudence of aboriginal rights has developed along the same
lines, and Canadian courts have frequently referred to American decisions
8 Such was the development of the law in the United States. See Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians v. United States (1954), 348 U.S. 272, and the approval of that decision in
Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, supra note 7 at 79. The relevant
American legislation directing compensation appears at 25 U.S.C. §70a (1964).
0 See, e.g., St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1886), 13 S.C.R.
577, 602 (Strong, J., dissenting), aff'd (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46; Regina v. White and
Bob (1964), 52 W.W.R. 193, 205 (B.C.C.A.) (Norris, L.A.). See also the discussion of
the breach of faith by the Government of Canada relative to Indian hunting rights in
Regina v. Sikyea (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150, 158 (N.W.T.C.A.), affd f19641 S.C.R.
642.
10 The most recent case is Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, supra
note 7. In describing a series of consultation meetings between the Indian Affairs branch
and native peoples, Harold Cardinal states: "Indians everywhere made it obvious that
they were interested in treaty rights, aboriginal rights and settlement of land claims first
and foremost." H. Cardinal, supra note 4 at 121. In view of the apparent refusal of
Prime Minister Trudeau to recognize aboriginal rights, further judicial clashes seem
inevitable. See Mr. Trudeau's "Vancouver Speech" of August 8, 1969 in Native Rights
In Canada, supra note 4 at Appendix 8.
11 See generally McInnes, Indian Treaties and Related Disputes (1969), 27 U. of
T.F.L. Rev. 52.
12 The effect of British colonial policies on the law of aboriginal rights in Canada
and the United States has been profound. See discussion at notes 146 to 182 and
accompanying text, infra.
'1 In both Canada and the United States for example, land settlements with the
Indians have been accomplished largely by treaties and the creation of Indian reserves.
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when dealing with this intricate subject.' 4 A comparative study is therefore
attempted.
The law of aboriginal rights is really a composite of several doctrines,
each with its own slowly evolving theories and dogma. Each of these doc-
trines in turn must be separately understood before we can comprehend the
whole. The various doctrines may be classified as: a) origins and recog-
nition of aboriginal rights; b) content of the right; c) extinguishment of
aboriginal title; d) compensation in cases of extinguishment.
The proliferation of American case law on this subject has resulted in
greater judicial scrutiny of each of these classifications in the United States
than in Canada, where the litigation has been limited. It will therefore be
both logical and convenient to begin our examination with the American
jurisprudence.
II ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Origins and Recognition of Aboriginal Rights.
The American law of aboriginal rights is derived from several early
decisions in the United States Supreme Court. Two cases in particular,
Johnson v. McIntosh5 and Worcester v. Georgia,'6 provide the theoretical
foundations for the law of original Indian title. While other aspects of the
law of aboriginal title have been elaborated upon by later courts, Chief
Justice Marshall's rulings in these two cases relative to the origins and recog-
nition of aboriginal rights, have stood virtually unchallenged.
In Johnson v. McIntosh plaintiffs brought an action in ejectment to
regain control over what they alleged was their property. Plaintiffs had re-
ceived the property under two grants from the chiefs of certain Indian tribes.
The same lands were subsequently resold by the same Indians to the United
States, which in turn conveyed the land to the defendant McIntosh. The
question in the case was "whether (plaintiff's) title can be recognized in the
courts of the United States?"' 7 In concluding that it cannot, the Court was
obliged to inquire into the character of Indian title and the ability of Indians
to convey their aboriginal lands to private individuals.
Worcester v. Georgia arose out of a criminal action by the State of
Georgia against Samuel A. Worcester. The basis of the charge was that
Worcester, a white missionary, was "'residing within the limits of the
Cherokee nation, without a license,' and 'without having taken the oath to
support and defend the constitution and laws of the state of Georgia',"' 8 all
of which constituted a high misdemeanor under state law. Defendant
1 4 See, e.g., Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, supra note 7; Regina
v. White and Bob, supra note 9.
15 (1823), 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 240.
16 (1832), 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 350.
17 21 U.S. at 253.
18 31 U.S. at 365.
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averred that the law under which he was charged was violative of several
treaties entered into by the United States and the Cherokee nation. He
urged that these treaties acknowledged the sovereignty of the Cherokees and
the freedom to govern themselves without interference by the states. As
such, defendant claimed that the law under which he was charged was un-
constitutional. The Supreme Court supported defendant's plea and declared
the law in question to be "repugnant to the constitution, treaties and laws of
the United States"'1 and therefore void. In the course of its decision, the
Court dealt with such important issues as the sovereignty of the Indian
nations and the origin and nature of their property rights.
In both Johnson v. McIntosh and Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice
Marshall formulated his conclusions respecting aboriginal title by an historical
analysis of the discovery and explorations of the American continent and by
relying upon established principles and practices of the law of nations.
20
The Chief Justice thus stated:
The great maritime powers of Europe discovered and visited different parts of this
continent, at nearly the same time. The object was too immense for any one of
them to grasp the whole; and the claimants were too powerful to submit to the
exclusive or unreasonable pretensions of any single potentate. To avoid bloody
conflicts, which might terminate disastrously to all, it was necessary for the nations
of Europe to establish some principle which all would acknowledge, and which
should decide their respective rights as between themselves. This principle, sug-
gested by the actual state of things, was, 'that discovery gave title to the govern-
ment by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other
European governments, which title might be consummated by possession.' 8
Wheat. 573.21 This principle, acknowledged by all Europeans, because it was the
interest of all to acknowledge it, gave to the nation making the discovery, as its
inevitable consequence, the sole right of acquiring the soil and of making settle-
ments on it. It was an exclusive principle, which shut out the right of competition
among those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the previous rights
of those who had not agreed to it. It regulated the right given by discovery among
the European discoverers; but could not affect the rights of those already in pos-
session, either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery
made before the memory of man. It gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did
not found that right on a denial of the right of the possessor to sell.22
Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives, were
to be regulated by themselves. The right thus acquired being exclusive, no other
power could interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were,
in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were, necessarily, to a considerable ex-
tent, impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a
legal as well as a just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to
their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent
10 ld. at 381.
20"[W]e must recognize that our Indian law originated, and can still be most clearly
grasped, as a branch of international law, and that in the field of international law
the basic concepts of modern doctrine were all hammered out by the Spanish theolo-
gical jurists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, most notably by the author of
the lectures De Indis, Francisco do Vitoria.
While Vitoria is not directly cited in any of the early opinions of the United States
Supreme Court on Indian cases, these opinions frequently refer to statements by
Grotius and Vattel that are either copied or adapted from the words of Vitoria. It is
thus clear that the tradition of legal teaching carried Vitoria's theories on Indian rights
to the judges and attorneys who formulated our legal doctrine in this field." Cohen,
The Spanish Origins of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States (1942), 31 Geo.
L. 1, 17. See also Cohen, Original Indian Title (1947), 32 Minn. L Rev. 28, 43-45;
Native Rights in Canada, supra note 4 at 14-18.
21 The citation is to Johnson v. McIntosh.
22 Worcester v. Georgia, (1832), 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 350, 369 (emphasis added).
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nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil, at
their own will, to whomsoever they please, was denied by the original funda-
mental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.23
Marshall's theory was responsive to the competing interests of those
European nations which were avariciously attempting to establish control
over a vast and unknown continent inhabited by a fiercely independent
native populous. Of necessity, the formulation was both novel and suited to
the peculiar circumstances of the day.24
One thing seems patently obvious from Marshall's analysis. Juridicial
recognition of aboriginal title was based upon the practice of the Europeans
in respecting the Indian right of occupancy and on the principles of inter-
national law. The European settlers (and their courts), perhaps already a
little embarrassed at their grandiose claims at having "discovered" America,25
clearly did not take the even more inflated view that Indian title must some-
how receive executive or legislative "recognizance" before it could be admit-
ted to exist.26
Marshall's explanation of the origin of aboriginal title undoubtedly
represents the least controverted aspect of the American law of aboriginal
rights.27 The Chief Justice's pronouncements upon the nature and content
of aboriginal claims however have undergone substantial interpretation by
subsequent courts. Nevertheless, the fundamental character of Marshall's
propositions relative to the nature of original title has persevered. As we shall
see, this may be more a depressing commentary upon the social attitudes of
the members of the judiciary, or at best upon the rigidities of the common law
system of precedent, than a cause for celebration at the foresight and wisdom
of the great Chief Justice.
B. The Content of an Aboriginal Claim
1. Marshall's Theories. In Johnson v. McIntosh and Worcester v.
Georgia Chief Justice Marshall asserted that an aboriginal claim was a legally
recognized right to occupy those lands held by Indians from time imme-
morial. On discovery, the legal title or fee to the newly claimed land went
23ohnson v. Mcrntosh, (1823), 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 240, 253-54.
24 "As a concept (aboriginal rights) seems to have developed in the context of
colonial dealings in North America. The new world and the particular character of its
inhabitants were treated as a novel situation." Native Rights in Canada, supra note
4 at 14.
25 "It is difficult to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either
quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabi-
tans of the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either, by
the other, should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled
the pre-existing right of its ancient possessors." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. at 368.
26 1n this respect and in some tribunals, the law seems to have regressed since
the early nineteenth century. See Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, supra
note 7.
27 But see id.
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to the State, subject to this aboriginal right of occupancy.28 The Indians'
property right was further limited in that alienation could be made solely to
the State or Crown. 29 The Indian title could be destroyed (extinguished)
by either conquest (and cession) or by purchase. While the Court stated
that the Indians had a "legal and just" claim to their lands, the decisions had
the obvious effect of severely limiting the strength of that claim.
Marshall readily conceded that his restrictive interpretation of abor-
iginal title "may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized
nations", 0 but justified the theory on the basis of conditions and circum-
stance. Marshall reasoned that the American Indian was savage and warlike.
As such, the normal principles of international law whereby property rights
in the acquired nation are respected, simply could not apply. Said the Chief
Justice:
Although we do not mean to engage in the defence of those principles which
Europeans have applied to Indian title, they may, we think, find some excuse, if
not justification, in the character and habits of the people whose rights have been
wrested from them.31
To have fully respected Indian property rights would mean the country would
have remained an uninhabitable wilderness reasoned Marshall. The discover-
28It is important to note that Marshall's theories were not wholly supported by
precedent and practice. In Fletcher v. Peck (1810), 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 48, the Chief
Justice rather hesitatingly laid the groundwork for his later holdings when he stated:
"The majority of the court is of the opinion, that the nature of the Indian title, which
is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be legitimately extinguished, is not
such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisen in fee on the part of the state (of Georgia).
Id. at 79. In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Johnson gave strong indication that he
viewed Indian title as being absolute. Id. at 80. Francis de Vitoria, the first theorist of
Indian land rights, took a far more generous view of Indian title than did Marshall:
"Vitoria asserted that the Indians were the true owners of the land both from the
public and private point of view ... Spain had no claim to the land through discovery
he said, because that notion only applied to unoccupied lands." Native Rights in Canada,
supra note 4 at 14-15. In addition, two of the European nations involved in the explo-
ration and settlement of North America made no assertion of title by discovery. "The
Dutch recognized aboriginal title in the land from the beginning of their activities ...
The British claimed rights by prior discovery and the Spanish claimed rights by the
papal grant. The Dutch and the Swedish based their claims on purchase. Id. at 52,
citing A. W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York - the 17th Century
(Cornell University Press, 1960) 45. Id. at 54, n.6. Finally, the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787, 1 Stat. 50 (1789), guarantees the Indians that their lands will never be taken
without their consent and gives no indication of the limited title which Chief Justice
Marshall subsequently ascribed to aboriginal rights.
20 See discussion at notes 22-23 and accompanying text, supra.
30 lohnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 261. "The title by conquest is acquired and
maintained by force. The conqueror prescribes its limits. Humanity, however, acting
on public opinion, has established, as a general rule that the conquered shall not be
wantonly oppressed ... Most usually, they are incorporated with the victorious nation,
and become subjects or citizens of the government with which they are connected ...
Where this incorporation is practicable, humanity demands, and a wise policy requires,
that the rights of the conquered to property should remain unimpaired. Id. at 260
(emphasis added). "It is a fundamental principle of international law that acquired
rights of foreign nationals must be respected. In the case of State succession this means
that the change of sovereignty works no effect upon such rights." 1 D.P. O'Connell,
International Law (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1965) 436. O'Connell defines
acquired rights as comprehending any "legal interest", including "real and personal
estate of all kinds." Id. at 436-37. See also M. F. Lindley, The Acquisition and
Government of Backward Territory in International Law (New York: Negro Univer-
sities Press, 1969) 45-47, 337-38; Article 17 (2) of The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights provides, "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." United
Nations, Office of Public Information (1948).
3lJohnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. at 260.
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ing nations either had to claim the fee in themselves and enforce their claims
by power or purchase, or else abandon their quest for North America. By
thus asserting the fee, the various sovereignties could easily parcel out the
land to white settlers once the Indians had been removed.
32
Despite the fact that the Chief Justice obviously had some qualms about
this peculiar theory of Indian title, he felt compelled to enforce it. Said
Marshall:
We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturalists, merchants and
manufacturers, have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the
territory they possess, or to contract their limits. Conquest gives a title which the
courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opin-
ions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has
been successfully asserted.
33
Even assuming the correctness of Marshall's proposition that a re-
stricted Indian title was necessary for the orderly settlement of North
America, it seems utterly fantastic that contemporary courts continue to
view aboriginal title in the same way that the United States Supreme Court
did in 1823. Marshall carefully explained that his novel theory of aboriginal
title was necessitated by the warlike and "savage" character of the native
population. It was these peculiar circumstances alone that rationalized a
theory which was (and is) nonconforming to the law of nations. Yet the
courts continue to employ Marshall's original theories regarding the nature
of aboriginal rights, despite the fact that the bases upon which those theories
rest have long since disappeared. That the courts have blithely continued
to diminish the property rights of Indian people, is evidence that North
American tribunals still regard the Indians' concept of land holdings as
inferior to that of the white man's.34 This social and political fact is perhaps
more important than all the legal niceties surrounding the question of abor-
iginal rights. Since it is doubtful that courts will face up to this question
however, a more careful examination into the judicial view of original
Indian title is in order.
2. Restrictions Upon Alienation. The "holding" in Johnson v. Mc-
Intosh was that the sale of Indian lands to private individuals was void be-
cause the "power (of Indians) to dispose of the soil, at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle,
that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it."'a5 The principle
that Indians could alienate their lands solely to the government (or to pri-
vate individuals with government consent)36 has received the unquestioned
approval of subsequent court decisions.37
321d. at 260-61.
83 ld. at 259-60. See also discussion at note 25, supra.
34 Felix Cohen has poignantly characterized this attitude as the "managerie" theory
of Indian title. Cohen describes the supporters of this view as believing that "Indians
are less than human and that their relation to their lands is not the human relation of
ownership but rather something similar to the relation that animals bear to the areas
in which they may be temporarily confined." Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note
20 at 58.
35 21 U.S. at 253-54.
36 Mitchel v. United States (1835), 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711.
37 See, e.g., Holden v. Joy, (1872), 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 244. See also Tee
Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, (1954), 348 U.S. 272, 280; United States v. Alcea
Band of Tillamooks (1946), 329 U.S. 40, 47; United States v. Cook (1873), 86 U.S.
(19 Wall.) 591, 592; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. at 369.
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3. The Developing Character of Indian Title. Within the limitations
initially imposed upon aboriginal rights, the courts have scrupulously accorded
respect toward original Indian title. In the McIntosh case, Chief Justice
Marshall declared the Indians were "the rightful occupants of the soil, with a
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according
to their own discretion.138 And in Cherokee Nation v., Georgia, Mr. Justice
Baldwin said: "Indians have rights of occupancy to their lands, as sacred as
the fee-simple absolute title of the whites . . ."39 The sacrosanct character
of Indian title was again affirmed in United States v. Cook, where the Court,
after citing Johnson v. McIntosh, stated: "The right of the Indians to their
occupancy is as sacred as that of the United States to the fee, but it is only
a right of occupancy." 40
Beyond these expressions of obeisance toward native rights, the Ameri-
can courts have stood firm in protecting aboriginal title from the attempted
encroachments of homesteaders, 41 railroads, 42 and even administrative
officials.43 A look at several representative cases will indicate the Supreme
Court's view of Indian land rights and the extent to which it was willing to
protect those rights.
In Cramer v. United States,44 the Federal Government brought suit on
behalf of three individual Indians against the Central Pacific Railway
Company. The plaintiff sought cancellation of a 1904 land patent issued
by the United States which interfered with the Indians' right of occupancy
upon certain lands. The defendants predecessor had received the land as a
result of the Act of July 25, 1866. This act excepted from the grant such
lands as "shall be found to have been granted, sold, reserved, occupied by
homestead settlers, pre-empted, or otherwise disposed of."'48 It is of
significance to note that the lands were not alleged to be part of a reservation
or covered by treaty. Cancellation was sought solely on the ground that the
Indians held the land by aboriginal possession. 46 Obviously the exceptive
provision of the 1866 Act was a general one and in no way constituted
"recognition" of aboriginal title. Moreover, the Court found these Indians
ineligible for the homestead privilege in the Act. The question then for the
Court was, were the lands "reserved ...or otherwise disposed of" within
the meaning of the Act?47 In concluding that they were, the Supreme Court
3821 U.S. at 253.
30 (1831), 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 47.
40 (1873), 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 593. See also Miller v. United States, 159 F.
(2d) 997 (9th Cir. 1947). "In Johnson v. McIntosh ... Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
stressed the point that, wherever the fee simple title might reside, it could be held in
Indian land 'subject only to the Indian right [or title] of occupancy' ".
Like a leitmotif, this quoted phrase runs through the Chief Justice's opinion and
through subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court." Id. at 1000, disapproved on other
grounds, Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co. (1949), 337 U.S. 86, 106, n. 28.
41 Holden v. Joy (1872), 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211.
42Buttz v. Northern Pac. R. R. (1886), 119 U.S. 55.
43 United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R. R. (1941), 314 U.S. 339.
44 (1922), 261 U.S. 219.
45 (1886), Ch. 242, §2, 14 Stat. 239.
46 261 U.S. at 225.
47 Id. at 227.
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said: "Unquestionably it has been the policy of the Federal Government
from the beginning to respect the Indian right of occupancy, which could
only be interfered with or determined by the United States. '48 Nor did it
matter that the right of occupancy was claimed by individual Indians rather
than a tribe: "It is true that this policy has had in view the original nomadic
tribal occupancy, but it is likewise true that in its essential spirit it applies to
individual Indian occupancy as well .. .49 And the court expressly reaffirmed
what had been implicit in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Johnson v.
McIntosh, namely: "The fact that such right of occupancy finds no recogni-
tion in any statute or other formal governmental action is not conclusive."5 0
The Court ordered the patent cancelled in respect to those lands possessed by
the Indians.
In United States v. Shoshone Tribes,51 the Shoshone sued the Federal
Government to recover the value of certain natural resources which had been
expropriated by the United States. While this case involved a treaty, the
issues were discussed largely from the perspective of aboriginal rights. The
reason for this is that the treaty in question did not deal with the issue of
natural resources. The Court was thus obliged to examine the content of the
aboriginal claim existing prior to the treaty.5
2
The Supreme Court described the Indian title as follows:
For all practical purposes, the tribe owned the land. Grants of land subject to the
Indian title by the United States, which had only the naked fee, would transfer
no beneficial interest ... The right of perpetual and exclusive occupancy of the
land is not less valuable than full title in fee.53
In language which bore unmistakably upon aboriginal rights, the Court
stated: "Although the United States retained the fee, and the tribe's right
of occupancy was incapable of alienation or of being held otherwise than in
common, that right is as sacred and as securely safeguarded as is fee simple
absolute title. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 48. Worcester v.
Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 580. Subject to the conditions imposed by the treaty,




5Old. at 229. In Buttz v. Northern Pac. R. R. (1886), 119 U.S. 55 the United
States granted certain lands to the Northern Pacific Railroad with the express provision
that Indian title be extinguished by the United States. In the context of a discussion of
Johnson v. McIntosh, the Court clearly stated the historic rights of the Indian occu-
pants vis-a-vis private individuals or corporations and the government: "The land in
controversy and other lands in Dakota, through which the Northern Pacific Railroad
was to be constructed, was within what is known as Indian country. At the time the
act of July 2nd, 1864; was passed, the title of the Indian tribes was not extinguished.
But that fact did not prevent the grant of Congress from operating to pass the fee of
the land to the company ... The Indians had merely a right of occupancy ... The
grant conveyed the fee subiect to this right of occupancy. The Railroad Company took
the property with this incumbrance. The right of the Indians, it is true, could not be
interfered with or determined except by the United States. No private individual
could invade it ... " Id. at 67. "It is to be noted that the Indians' right of occupancy
in 1864 had not yet been defined by any treaty ... The Buttz case stands, therefore,
as a clear warning that neither settlers nor railroads can ignore aboriginal Indian title."
Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 20, at 53.
51 (1937), 304 U.S. 111.
52 Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 20, at 54.
53 304 U.S. at 116.
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to Indians, undisturbed possessors of the soil from time immemorial." 54 Con-
cluding that natural resources "are constituent elements of the land itself", 5
and that the treaty did not provide otherwise, the Court ruled the Shoshones
had the right to compensation for the taking of such resources.
The last case which will aid us in understanding the content of abori-
ginal title as viewed by American courts is United States v. Santa Fe Pacific
Railroad Company.6 This suit was brought by the United States on behalf
of the Walapai Tribe in Arizona to enjoin the defendant from interfering
with the occupancy of the Walapais. The defendant claimed full title to the
lands in question by virtue of a government grant to its predecessor under the
Act of July 27, 1866. 57 Section 2 of that Act ordered the United States to
extinguish the Indian tile to all lands falling within the operation of the Act.
The Indian lands involved in the suit were part of the Mexican Cession 5
and had, prior to 1866, received no formal recognition either by statute or
treaty. Any rights which the Walapais had were based solely upon possession
from time immemorial.59 What was affirmed in Cramer was conclusively
proclaimed in Santa Fe: "Nor is it true, as respondent urges, that a tribal
claim to any particular lands must be based upon a treaty, statute, or other
formal government action."60
The Court unanimously reaffirmed the long standing policy of the
Federal Government and the American courts to respect the Indian right of
occupancy. In doing so, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeal, which held that "the United States had never recognized such pos-
sessory rights of Indians within the Mexican Cession ..."61. Noting that the
decision in Cramer had "assumed that lands within the Mexican Cession
were not excepted from the policy to respect Indian right of occupancy", 62
the Court went on to reaffirm its view that Indian occupied lands obtained
from other nations have all the attributes of unextinguished Indian title.63
The Court concluded that Indian title existed in at least part of the lands
claimed and found that those claims had not been extinguished. Defendant
was duly ordered to make an accounting for its use of such lands."
These and similar cases65 establish that the Supreme Court was prepared
to grant substantial protection to aboriginal rights, particularly as against
54 Id. at 117.
65 Id. at 116. That aboriginal claims include the ownership of natural resources on
the claimed lands had been reaffirmed in United States v. Northern. Paiute Nation,
393 F. 2d 786, 796 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Miami Tribe v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 926,
942 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
56 (1941), 314 U.S. 339.
67 14 Stat. 292.
58 Ceded by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), 9 Stat. 922.
69 314 U.S. at 345.
60 Id. at 347.
61 Id. at 345.
02 Id.
03 Id. at 346. See also discussion at note 76 to 77 and accompanying text, infra.
04 314 U.S. at 359-60.
65 See also Holden v. Joy (1872), 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211; Choteau v. Molony
1853), 57 U.S. (16 How.) 203; Mitchel v. United States (1835), 34 U.S. (9 Pet.)64.
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private individuals or corporations. In those cases involving governmental
action, the Court seemed prepared to go out of its way to utilize legislative
protections of pre-existing rights in order to prevent administrative intrusion
upon aboriginal claims.
More difficult questions remained, however. Chief Justice Marshall
had written that the Government could "extinguish" the Indian right of
occupancy. What were the characteristics of such an extinguishment? What
if the government alienated aboriginal lands and there was no legislation
protecting pre-existing native rights? In this inescapable confrontation between
the government and the Indians, would the Court grant the supposedly
"sacred" right of occupancy the protection of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and thereby order compensation?66 These questions
set the stage for a fierce battle which was to take place within the United
States Supreme Court, a battle in which the ultimate loser would have been
the Indian people, had not Congress come to the rescue "in the nick of
time".
C. Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title
As with the policy of eminent domain, the Government's ability to
extinguish Indian title has never been doubted or denied. The important
questions here relate to executive and legislative policies respecting extin-
guishment, and the judicial presumptions which have been formed in response
to such policies.
Like the other phases of the law of aboriginal rights, the judicially
contrived rules of extinguishment are derived from Johnson v. McIntosh. The
policy of extinguishment is of course, the logical sequence to the principle of
exclusive dealing discussed earlier.67 Extinguishment was thus described by
Chief Justice Marshall:
The United States, then, have unequivocally acceded to that great and broad
rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country. They hold, and
assert in themselves, the title by which it was acquired. They maintain, as all
others have maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the
Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest ...68
An analysis of Marshall's description would indicate that the Supreme
Court viewed the matter of extinguishment as entirely within the realm of
the other branches of government, and that following this, the politicians
and bureaucrats could nullify the rights of native peoples in whatever
manner was convenient. Indeed, as recently as 1941, a unanimous Supreme
Court seemed to reaffirm this policy most emphatically:
"Extinguishment of Indian title based on aboriginal possession is of
course a different matter. The power of Congress in that regard is supreme.
66he Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, inter alia:
"No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. Const. amend. V.
67 See discussion at note 35 to 37 and accompanying text, supra.
68 21 U.S. at 259 (emphasis added).
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The manner, method and time of such extinguishment raise political, not
justiciable, issues ... And whether it be done by treaty, by the sword, by
purchase, by the exercise of complete dominion adverse to the right of
occupancy, or otherwise, its justness is not open to inquiry in the courts.
Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525." 69
It may appear then that in a dispute between the government and the
Indians over aboriginal rights, the government could act as arbitrarily, or
as fairly, as it pleased. Such a view however ignores almost two centuries of
official government policy toward native rights, and the judicial views which
have been melded in recognition of this official policy.
The policy of Congressional respect for Indian rights was demonstrated
as early as 1787 in the Northwest Ordinance. This statute declared that:
"The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their
lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent...
70
The attitude of Congress was further demonstrated in the statutes which
granted lands to the railroads. These statutes typically made express provision
for the fair extinguishment of aboriginal title. Section 2 of the Act7l under
consideration in United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad provided: "The
United States shall extinguish, as rapidly as may be consistent with public
policy and the welfare of the Indians, and only by their voluntary cession,
the Indian title to all lands falling under the operation of this act...-72
These policies have received cognizance in numerous Supreme Court
decisions, commencing with the early case of Worcester v. Georgia.73 Indeed,
the policy of extinguishing Indian title only upon equitable terms has been
so consistently applied in American history that not only will the Court
69 United States v. Sante Fe Pac. R. R. (1941), 314 U.S. 339, 347 (emphasis
added).
70 (1789), 1 Stat. 50 (emphasis added).
71 Act of July 27, 1866, 14 Stat. 292.
72 Similar language appears in the Act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 365, considered
in Buttz v. Northern Pac. R. R. (1886), 119 U.S. 55. See also Cramer v. United States
(1922), 261 U.S. 219, where the Court construed the exception to the railroad grant
in the Act of July 25, 1866, 14 Stat. 239 in favour of the Indians' right of occupancy;
Section 14 of the Act creating the territorial government of Oregon (1848), 9 Stat. 323,
329, incorporated by reference all the guarantees of the Northwest Ordinance. See,
generally, Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 20 at 34.
7a In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall stated that the principle that discovery
gave title "gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did not found that right on a
denial of the possessor to sell ... " It was rather "the exclusive right of purchasing
such lands as the natives were willing to sell." 31 U.S. at 369-70. In his concurring
opinion, Mr. Justice McLean described the policy of the early settlers with respect to
native lands: "[Olur ancestors, when they first migrated to this country, might have taken
possession of a limited extent of the domain, had they been sufficiently powerful, with-
out negotiation or purchase from the native Indians. But this course is believed to
been nowhere taken. A more conciliatory mode was preferred, and one which was
better calculated to impress the Indians, who were then powerful, with a sense of the
justice of their white neighbours. The occupany of their lands was never assumed,
except upon the basis of contract, and on the payment of a valuable consideration.
This policy has obtained from the earliest white settlements in this country, down to
the present time." Id. at 391-92.
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presume that the government intended to act fairly,74 but further, only the
most deliberate governmental action will be viewed as properly extinguishing
aboriginal rights at all.
75
A final and very important question involving extinguishment relates
to which sovereignty may effect the nullification of Indian title. Aside from
the territory held by the original thirteen States, almost all of the United States
has been acquired by cession or purchase from other countries. 7 If the
European nations had extinguished aboriginal title in the acquired areas,
then of course such title would receive no recognition by the United States.
In fact, the Supreme Court has held that virtually all the territory acquired
from the Europeans was subject to outstanding aboriginal claims which had
been respected by the foreign owners of the fee. 77 Upon acquisition, the
lands became part of the federal domain and were subject to the rules
respecting aboriginal rights developed from Johnson v. McIntosh. Under
these circumstances, only the Federal Government could extinguish Indian
title. Could however the various state governments extinguish such title once
they were admitted to the Union and had sovereignty over otherwise un-
claimed lands within their jurisdictions?78 Both Johnson v. McIntosh and
Worcester v. Georgia spoke only in terms of the United States having the
ability to extinguish Indian title. This view was reaffirmed in United States v.
Santa Fe Pacific Railroad.79 But the issue was only fully discussed for the
first time in the recent case of Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States.
8 0
74 While conceding the ability of the Federal Government to extinguish aboriginal
title, the Supreme Court in Beecher v. Wetherby (1877), 95 U.S. 517, 525 said: "It is
to be presumed that in this matter the United States would be governed by such con-
siderations of justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an
ignorant and dependent race." See also United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks
(1946), 329 U.S. 40; Cramer v. United States (1922), 261 U.S. 219; Buttz v. Nor-
thern Pac. R. R. (1886), 119 U.S. 55.
75 314 U.S. at 354. It is of both importance and interest to note that the Court
refused to view the forcible removal of the Walapai Indians to a reservation on order
of the Indian Department as working an extinguishment of their ancestral title. Speak-
ing for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Douglas eloquently restated American legisla-
tive and judicial policy on this issue: 'Their forcible removal in 1874 was not pur-
suant to any mandate of Congress. It was a high-handed endeavor to wrest from these
Indians lands which Congress had never declared forfeited. No forfeiture can be
predicated on an unauthorized attempt to effect a forcible settlement on the reservation,
unless we are to be insensitive to the high standards for fair dealing in light of which
laws dealing with Indian rights have long been read." Id. at 355-56 (emphasis added).
76The outstanding exception to this pattern was the voluntary union of the inde-
pendent Republic of Texas with the United States in 1845.
77 'iMhe right of sovereignty over discovered land was always subject to the right
of use and occupancy and enjoyment of the land by Indians living on the land.' Sac
and Fox Tribe v. United States (1967), 179 Ct. Cl. 8, 21. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized this, explicitly or implicitly, in dealing with territory in this country acquired from
various other nations. Worcester v. State of Georgia (1832), 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 350
(original States); Chouteau v. Molony (1853), 57 U.S. (16 How.) 203 (Louisiana
Purchase); Cramer v. United States (1923), 261 U.S. 219 (Mexican Cession); Mitchel v.
United States (1835), 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 464 (Florida); United States v. Tillamooks
(1946), 329 U.S. 40 (Oregon); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States (1954), 348 U.S.
272 (Alaska); Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States (1967), 180 Ct. Cl. 487, 493.
78 The extent of state ownership of land within its boundaries is determined by the
terms of admission for each state. See Minnesota v. Hitchcock (1902), 185 U.S. 373,
391.
79 (1941), 314 U.S. 339, 347.
80 (1967), 180 Ct. Cl. 487.
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In Lipan, the United States Court of Claims was faced with an assertion
that the State of Texas could and did extinguish Indian title by a legislative
Act of April 29, 1846.81 On reviewing the implicit contrary assumptions of
the extinguishment cases, the court concluded:
Our view is different: that the State could not extinguish Indian title (at least
without the Indians' consent) and that only the Federal Government had the
power to abrogate aboriginal ownership by unilateral action. It makes no differ-
ence that the lands were State-owned; the Federal Government's power stemmed,
not from the ownership of public lands in this instance, but more importantly
from the general grant of the right to deal with Indians. The Constitution has
vested in the national government the authority to regulate Indian affairs ...82
One aspect of this federal authority is clearly the power to extinguish Indian
title.83
In the United States then, the only authority which could legally extin-
guish Indian title was the Federal Government.
D. Compensation For The Taking of Aboriginal Lands.
However much the Supreme Court presumed the government to have
acted honorably towards the Indian, the question of what happened if the
United States undeniably extinguished Indian title without providing just
compensation, inevitably arose. It was on this issue that the increasingly
enlightened Indian rights decisions of the Supreme Court were to founder.
The early cases dealing with compensation seemed to occasion little
substantive difficulty. The Court took the strong view that a deprivation of
Indian lands by the Federal Government constituted a compensable expro-
priation under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
A good example is provided in United States v. Klamath Indians.
8 4
In 1864, the Klamath Indians held by immemorial possession 20,000,000
acres of what is now Oregon and California. With the exception of a tract
reserved for the occupancy of the Klamaths, most of this land was ceded to
the United States in a treaty signed the following year. In 1906, the Federal
Government conveyed 87,000 acres of the reserved lands to a private cor-
poration without the consent of the Indians and without providing full com-
pensation. The Klamaths brought suit under a special jurisdictional act
passed by Congress in 1936.85 The Supreme Court made explicit the consti-
81 Id. at 497.
82 While the United States Constitution does not assign direct authority over
Indians to the Federal Government, the latter does possess the exclusive power to
make treaties and regulate commerce with Indians. U.S. Const. art. I, §8(3), 10. In
Canada, sction 91(24) of the British North America Act delegates exclusive and direct
authority over "Indians, and lands reserved for the Indians" to the Dominion. See
discussion at notes 210 and accompanying text, infra.
83 180 Ct. Cl. at 497.
84 (1937), 304 U.S. 119.
85 Act of May 15, 1936, 49 Stat. 1276. Aside from the substantive difficulties of
proving claims for confiscation of Indian lands, the American Indian has been faced
with formidable procedural obstacles. The "Act of March 3, 1863, which gave the
Court of Claims the status of a court with authority to render judgements, specifically
excepted from the court's jurisdiction 'any claim against the government ... dependent
on any treaty entered into ... with Indian tribes." Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Claims
Before the Court of Claims (1966), 55 Geo. L J. 511, 511-12. The effect was that
Indians with any grievance against the government could only obtain relief if Congress
passed a special jurisdictional act allowing litigation in the specified dispute. The
jurisdictional problem was considerably ameliorated with the 1946 passage of the
Indian Claims Comm'n Act (1964), 25 U.S.C. §70. See generally Wilkinson, id.
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tutional restraints upon government action relative to Indian lands:
It is appropriate first to observe that while the United States has power to
control and manage the affairs of its Indian wards in good faith for their
welfare, that power is subject to constitutional limitations, and does not enable
the United States without paying just compensation therefore to appropriate
lands of an Indian tribe to its own use or to hand them over to others.80
Similar and indeed stronger language appears in many of the other "com-
pensation cases".87
Our consideration of these cases is not yet complete however. For in
each of the compensation cases there was an element which was to become
of critical importance in the aboriginal rights decisions of the 1940's and
early 1950's. This element consisted of the fact that all the Indian lands
involved in the compensation cases had received so-called "recognition" by
either treaty or act of Congress. These lands then were typically the well
known "Indian reserves". Perhaps because of its ubiquity, or possibly because
the Court felt the issue of recognition was of no significant import, the earlier
Supreme Court decisions used the same language in describing the nature and
content of unrecognized aboriginal title as it did in describing recognized title.
Thus in Shoshone Tribe v. United States,s8 in which a treaty designated
Indian lands, Mr. Justice Cardozo stated: "The right of the Indians to the
occupancy of the lands pledged to them, may be one of occupancy only,
but it is 'as sacred as that of the United States to the fee'." 89 If the nature of
Indian title was the same whether "recognized" or not, should not that title
also be afforded the consistent protection of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution?
Following some anticipatory rumblings in the 1944 case of Shoshone
Indians v. United States,90 this issue burst upon the Court two years later in
United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks.91
In 1850, Congress authorized the negotiation of treaties with the Indians
of the Oregon territory. A treaty with the Tillamook Indians was concluded
in 1855 and a reservation was created upon a part of the lands to which the
86 304 U.S. at 123.
87See, e.g., Shoshone Tribe v. United States (1936), 299 U.S. 476, 497; United
States v. Shoshone Tribe (1937), 304 U.S. 111; United States v. Creek Nation (1934),
295 U.S. 103; Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa (1919), 249 U.S. 110; Cherokee Nation
v. Hitchcock (1902), 187 U.S. 294.
88 (1936), 299 U.S. 476.
89 Id. at 497. "Whether this tract, which was known as the Red Lake Indian
reservation, was properly called a reservation, as the defendant contends, or unceded
Indian country, as the plaintiff insists, is a matter of little moment. Confessedly the fee
of the land was in the United States, subject to a right of occupancy by the Indians.
That fee the Government might convey, and whenever the Indian right of occupancy
was terminated (if such termination was absolute and unconditional), the grantee of
the fee would acquire a perfect and unburdened title and right of possession.
At the same time, the Indians' right of occupancy has always been held to be sacred;
something not to be taken from him except by his consent and then upon such consi-
deration as should be agreed upon. Minnesota v. Hitchcock (1902), 185 U.S. 373,
388-89 (emphasis added) (a treaty covered the lands in question); Worcester v.
Georgia (1832), 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 350, uniformly cited as one of the cornerstones of
the theory of aboriginal rights, itself involved lands guaranteed by treaty. See discussion
at notes 38-40 and accompanying text, supra.
90 (1944), 324 U.S. 335. See the dissenting opinion of Douglas, I., at 358, 359-60.
91 (1946), 329 U.S. 40.
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Tillamooks held claim from time immemorial. The treaty however was never
ratified by the United States Senate and the Tillamooks brought suit for
compensation for the loss of the aboriginal lands lying outside the reservation.
The government contended that absent some form of official "recognition",
aboriginal lands could be appropriated without incurring liability.
92
The jurisdictional act under which the suit was brought expressly allowed
the adjudication of claims based on original Indian title.93. As the Court
noted however, the effect of the jurisdictional act was merely to remove "the
impediments of sovereign immunity and lapse of time. By this Act Congress
neither admitted nor denied liability."9 4 The question of compensation for
an expropriation absent "recognition", was to be squarely faced then.
The issue, said the Court, turned on the content of original Indian
title. 5 The Court briefly discussed the leading decisions defining aboriginal
rights 0 and reviewed the traditional Congressional policy requiring compen-
sation for the extinguishment of Indian claims.97 Notwithstanding a strong
dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Reed, the conclusion seemed inevitable.
Declared Mr. Chief Justice Vinson for the Court:
In our opinion, taking original Indian title without compensation and without
consent does not satisfy the 'high standards for fair dealing' required of the
United States in controlling Indian affairs. United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.
Co., 314 U.S. 339, 356 (1941). The Indians have more than a merely moral
claim for compensation. 98
In reaching its conclusion the Court noted that no decisions of the
Supreme Court had supported a dichotomy between recognized ("reserved"
lands) and unrecognized (aboriginal lands) Indian title.99 The unquestioned
rule that compensation is required for expropriation of recognized Indian
title said the Court, is equally applicable to unrecognized title.100 Not only
had there been no cases urging a legal distinction between the two types of
title, but the Court took cognizance of what was manifest in its previous
decisions - Indian title had traditionally been viewed as having the same
02Id. at 42.
93 The Act of August 26, 1935, 49 Stat. 801 provides, in relevant part: "[Jjurisdic-
tion is conferred on the Court of Claims with the right of appeal to the Supreme
Court ... to hear ... and render final judgement (on) ... (b) any and all legal and
equitable claims arising under or growing out of the original Indian title, claim or
rights in, to, or upon the whole or any part of the lands and their appurtenances
occupied by the Indian tribes and described in (certain) unratified treaties..."
04 329 U.S. at 45.
05 Id. at 46.
0 Id. at 46-47.
07 Id. at 47-49. See discussion at notes 70 to 72 and accompanying text, supra.
98 Id. at 47 (citation omitted).
99 Id. at 51.
100 Id. at 52. See discussion at notes 84 to 87 and accompanying text, supra.
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legal attributes and potency whether it had received Congressional "recogni-
tion" or not.1' 1
For the Indians and their supporters,102 Tillamooks was nothing short
of a stunning victory. The emasculated stature which Chief Justice Marshall
had originally given aboriginal title, was now effectively undone. For the
first time, aboriginal claims were to be as truly inviolate and sacrosanct as
the Supreme Court had so long professed them to be.
03
The occasion was short lived however. Like the broken promises of
history, the high sounding words were but ephemeral rays of hope and the
forked tongue of the white man's tribunal would soon enough reveal itself
in a subsequent "clarification". Had not Congress fortuitously passed the
Indian Claims Commission Act, the 1954 decision in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States04 would have hurtled the cause of aboriginal rights back to its
uncivilized legal status in Johnson v. McIntosh.10
In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, a band of Alaskan Indians brought suit under
the Fifth Amendment demanding compensation for the taking of certain
timber on lands to which the plaintiffs had an aboriginal claim. Procedurally,
the suit was brought under the then recently passed jurisdictional act per-
mitting suits for Indian claims accruing after August 13, 1946.100
As in Tillamooks, the Court determined the basic issue to be "the nature
of the petitioner's (Indians') interest in the land, if any."' 07 In reviewing that
interest, Mr. Justice Reed conveniently ignored the long line of decisions
which had consistently viewed original Indian title as being "as sacred as the
fee" and had consequently accorded that title a great deal of vitality. Justice
Reed preferred to speak of aboriginal rights in pejorative terms, indicating it
101 "Other cases also draw no distinction between original Indian title and 'recog-
nized' Indian title. 'The Indian title as against the United States was merely a title and
right to the perpetual occupancy of the land with the privilege of using it in such mode
as they saw fit until such right of occupation has been surrendered to the government
When Indian reservations were created, either by treaty or executive order, the Indians
held the land by the same character of title, to wit, the right to possess and occupy the
lands for the uses and purposes designated.' Spalding v. Chandler (1896), 160 U.S.
394, 403. Of similar tenor is Conley v. Ballinger (1910), 216 U.S. 84, 90.91." Id. at
52, n. 30.
102 See the enthusiastic discussion of the Tillamooks decision in Cohen, Original
Indian Title, supra note 20 at 56-58.
103 Even after Tillamooks, Indian title was not the legal equivalent of fee simple.
The limitation on alienability for example, continued as before.
104 (1954), 348 U.S. 272.
105 By Chief Justice Marshall's own admission, his theory of aboriginal rights was
nonconforming to the law of civilized nations. See discussion at notes 30 to 33 and
accompanying text, supra.
106 (1964), 28 U.S.C. §1505 provides: "The Court of Claims shall have jurisdic-
tion of any claim against the United States accruing after August 13, 1946, in favor of
any tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians ... whenever such
claim is one arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, or
Executive orders of the President, or is one which otherwise would be cognizable in
the Court of Claims if the claimant were not an Indian tribe, band or group."
107 348 U.S. at 275.
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consisted merely of "permission from the whites to occupy" rather than a
tangible "property right".108
The holding of Tee-Hit-Ton is that there is no right to compensation
for an expropriation of Indian lands held only by aboriginal title. (The Court
of Claims found that plaintiffs here did indeed have an aboriginal claim to
the land in question). 109
Before we subject this decision to further analytical scrutiny, let us
understand its precedential implications. What the United States Supreme
Court was effectively saying was that the government could, with impunity,
dispose of lands upon which a people had resided and made their home from
time immemorial. The unhappy conclusion must be that the Tee-Hit-Ton
case represents nothing more than a perfidious rationalization for the out-
right theft of private property by the United States Government.
In reaching its iniquitous decision, the Court gave substance to a
dichotomous view of Indian title. The dichotomy was that of "recognized"
and "unrecognized" title, with only the former compensable in cases of
expropriation. 110 As discussed above, this distinction was considered and
expressly rejected in Tillamooks and has been implicitly rejected by numerous
other Supreme Court decisions."'
Indeed, Mr. Justice Reed was able to cite obiter remarks of but a single
precedent, written by himself, to lend support to his theory that only
"recognized title" was compensable. 112 As further support for its holding, the
Court quoted at length from several judgments dealing with the issue of
extinguishment." 3 As we have seen however, the issue of extinguishment is
quite distinct from the question of liability arising from extinguishment. As the
Court said in Tillamooks: "Admitting the undoubted power of Congress to
extinguish original Indian title compels no conclusion that compensation need
not be paid." 114
108Id. at 279. In stating that aboriginal title consists of nothing more viable than
"permission from the whites to occupy", Mr. Justice Reed regressed even further than
the 1823 opinion in Johnson v. McIntosh in which Chief Justice Marshall described
aboriginal rights as constituting a "legal as well as just claim to retain possession of
(the soil) ." 21 U.S. at 253. While the ultimate holding of Tee-Hit-Ton cannot but be
admitted, much of its discussion of the nature of aboriginal title is flagrantly inconsistent
with the American jurisprudence of native rights, and must therefore be viewed as an
aberration.
10) 348 U.S. at 275.
110 Id. at 288-89. As to the substantive nature of this recognition, the Court said:
'There is no particular form for congressional recognition of Indian right of permanent
occupancy. It may be established in a variety of ways but there must be the definite
intention by congressional action or authority to accord legal rights, not merely per-
missive occupation." Id. at 278-79.
11 See discussion at notes 88 to 89 and note 101 accompanying text, supra.
112The cited case was Shoshone Indians v. United States (1944), 324 U.S. 335,
decided by a Court split 5-4. The opinion written by Justice Reed in Shoshone was
fully supported by only two other justices. Moreover, the assertion that unrecognized
title was not compensable was obiter dicta, there being a treaty involved in the case. In
Tillamooks, the Court expressly rejected the argument that the Shoshone case can be
cited as support for the theory that only recognized title is compensable. 329 U.S. at 50.
118 348 U.S. at 280-81.
114 329 U.S. at 47.
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Conceding that Tillamooks "contains language indicating that unrecog-
nized Indian title might be compensable under the Constitution when taken
by the United States", 1 5 the Court was able to rely upon two intervening
decisions which held that Tillamooks did not rest upon the Fifth Amendment.
In Hynes v. Grimes Packing Company, Justice Reed, speaking for the Court,
ruled that Tillamooks "does not hold the Indian right of occupancy compens-
able without specific legislative direction to make payment."'1 , And when
Tillamooks again came before the Supreme Court solely on the issue of
compensation, the Court held that no interest was due on the claim as none
of the opinions in the original case "was grounded on a taking under the
Fifth Amendment."" 7 As our discussion of Tillamooks demonstrated, the
Court there held the same compensation rules should apply in cases involving
recognized title (clearly compensable under the Fifth Amendment) as in
those involving non-recognized title.""' It surely followed then that the Fifth
Amendment thus applied to non-recognized Indian title. If the Fifth Amend-
ment was not the basis for recovery in Tillamooks, what then was? Tee-Hit-
Ton supplies us with the incredible answer.
We think it must be concluded that the recovery in the Tillamook case was based
upon statutory direction to pay for the aboriginal title in the special jurisdictional
act to equalize the Tillamooks with the neighboring tribes, rather than upon a
holding that there had been a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.119
As we have seen, Tillamooks went to pains to make clear that the jurisdic-
tional act "neither admitted nor denied liability."'' 20 The Act was purely
procedural and involved no direction to pay whatsoever.
What must be concluded from this? Obviously the Supreme Court was
unhappy with its previous decision. Yet rather than admit its true opinion of
Tilamooks, the Court resorted to deliberate distortion in order to distinguish
its former decision.
Mr. Justice Douglas, who voted with the majority on Tillamooks,
registered a brief dissenting opinion which limited itself to the view that the
1884 Organic Act of Alaska constituted "recognition" of plaintiff's title.' 2'
Yet the second Tillamooks case conclusively demonstrated that the full
Court was averse to enforcing aboriginal claims via the Fifth Amendment.
Why this sudden and dramatic change of heart by the High Bench? While
no conclusive explanation can be advanced, it would be somewhat naive
not to consider the fact that the Indian Claims Commission Act became
effective the same year (1946) as the first Tillamooks decision. Thereafter,
most Indian claimants had to rely on the Act to enforce aboriginal claims.
22
Claims for expropriation in the United States do not carry interest except in
those cases in which a claim arises under the Fifth Amendment. 2 3 Thus
115 348 U.S. at 282.
116 (1949), 337 U.S. 86, 106, n. 28.
117 (1951), 341 U.S. 48, 49.
118 See text accompanying note 100, supra.
119 348 U.S. at 284 (citation omitted).
120 329 U.S. at 45. See discussion at notes 93 to 94 and accompanying text, supra.
121 348 U.S. at 291.
122 All claims accruing prior to August 13, 1946 had to be pursued via the Indian
Claims Comm'n Act (1964), 25 U.S.C. §70.
123 See United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks (1951), 341 U.S. 48 and cases
cited therein.
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aboriginal claims arising under the Indian Claims Commission Act do not
contain interest. 124 Had Tillamooks been decided on Fifth Amendment
grounds, the plaintiffs there would have recovered substantial interest while
their fellow claimants under the Act would not.
125
There seems little doubt but that the passage of the Indian Claims
Commission Act contributed substantially to the shift in the Supreme Court's
attitude toward aboriginal claims. The Court broadly hinted at this in its
closing passage in Tee-Hit-Ton:
Our conclusion does not uphold harshness as against tenderness toward the
Indians, but it leaves with Congress, where it belongs, the policy of Indian
gratuities for the termination of Indian occupancy of Government-owned land
rather than making compensation for its value a rigid constitutional principle. 126
It is nevertheless most unfortunate that the poorly reasoned opinion in
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians represents the last word of the Supreme Court on the
constitutional aspect of this important subject.
E. Proving Aboriginal Claims Under the Indian Claims Commission Act.
While a thorough review of the substantive and procedural issues in-
volved in proving aboriginal claims before the Indian Claims Commission is
properly the subject of a separate study, our consideration of aboriginal rights
would be incomplete if we did not briefly allude to this matter.
In Otoe and Missouria Tribe of Indians v. United States,127 the United
States Court of Claims held that a taking of bare aboriginal title was com-
pensable under the Indian Claims Commission Act. The issues with which
the Claims Commission and the Court of Claims have since had to deal
relate to the legal requisites for proving an aboriginal claim and the methods
by which these predicates to a claim may be established.
The decisions of the Court of Claims have accepted as definitive the
statement that aboriginal title must rest upon "a showing of actual, exclusive
and continuous use and occupancy for a long time prior to the loss of the
property."'1 8 Obviously, this definition incorporates several requirements,
each of which must be proved before an aboriginal claim can be made out.
Perhaps the most stringent requirement to be met in stating an aboriginal
claim is that of exclusive control. While "joint and amicable possession of
the property by two or more tribes or groups will not defeat 'Indian Title' ",,129
124 See Nooksack Tribe of Indians v. United States (1963), 162 Ct. Cl. 712, 718;
Wilkinson, supra note 85 at 524-28.
12 5 See Aleea Band of Tillamooks v. United States (Ct. Cl. 1950), 87 F. Supp. 938.
120 348 U.S. at 290-91. While most aboriginal claims have undoubtedly "accrued"
prior to the cutoff date of August 13, 1946 set out in the Indian Claims Comm'n Act
("accrual" occurs with the act of extinguishment), it is certainly possible that a claim
could arise subsequent to that date. The Tee-Hit-Ton case, which foreclosed recovery
under such circumstances, is surely the most poignant example.
127 (Ct. Cl. 1955), 131 F. Supp. 265.
128 Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians v. United States, 315 F. (2d) 896 (Ct. C1.),
cert. denied (1963), 375 U.S. 921. See also United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R. R. (1941),
314 U.S. 339, 345; Lummi Tribe of Indians v. United States (1967), 181 Ct. Cl. 753,
759; United States v. Seminole Indians (1967), 180 Ct. Cl. 375, 383; Confederated
Tribes v. United States (1966), 177 Ct. Cl. 184, 194.
120 Confederated Tribes v. United States (1966), 177 Ct. C1. 184, 194, n. 6.
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extended disputation over control of a particular area will defeat such a
claim. 13 0 Obviously, such conflict must extend beyond an occasional foray by
hostile marauders. 31 And the existence of scattered and numerically small
groupings of other tribes who in no way challenge the dominion of the claim-
ant tribe, will also be insufficient to defeat the claim.1 32
In addition to exclusive control of a "defined" territory, 33 Indian claim-
ants are required to show actual and continuous use and occupancy of the
land. This requirement has been given an expansive interpretation by the
courts in light of the customs and habits of many Indian tribes.
A good example of the application of this legal standard is provided
by the case of United States v. Seminole Indians.'34 In the Seminole case,
the Court of Claims was called upon to determine if, prior to an 1823 treaty
of cession,13 5 the Seminole Indians had a valid aboriginal claim to the Florida
peninsula. While the court held there was little doubt that the Seminoles had
exclusive possession of Florida, 36 the question remained: "Was the Semi-
noles' use and occupancy of the land of an extent sufficient to support a reco-
gnition of Indian title encompassing virtually all of the Florida peninsula?'
3 7
The Government offered several historical facts militating against such
a claim. It noted that the permanent Seminole villages were not only limited
in number (about 17) but that they were confined almost exclusively to
northern Florida. In addition, the total Seminole population did not exceed
2,500 persons up to 1814. As such, the Government contended the Seminoles
did not and indeed, could not, occupy the vast Florida peninsula.
38
As had other courts, the Court of Claims in Seminole distinguished
between Indians who survived by agriculture and those who subsisted by
hunting, trapping, and food-gathering. The Seminoles were clearly in the
latter category. Unlike those engaged in agriculture, hunters were required
to utilize and temporarily "occupy" large areas of land. The court found
that the Seminoles made "extensive use of the southern peninsula" and that
of necessity, made temporary encampments in their hunting grounds. 39
Given that the Seminoles had exclusive control of the area, the court reaffirm-
ed that "'use and occupancy' essential to the recognition of Indian title does
not demand actual possession of the land, but may derive through intermit-
tent contacts, Spokane Tribe of Indians v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 58, 66
(1963), which define some general boundaries of the occupied land, Upper
130 See, e.g., Pueblo De Zia v. United States (1964), 165 Ct. C1. 501; Confederated
Tribes v. United States (1966), 177 Ct. Cl. 184.
'3' See, e.g., Pueblo De Zia v. United States (1964), 165 Ct. Cl. 501, 505.
132 See, e.g., United States v. Seminole Indians (1967), 180 Ct. Cl. 375, 383.
133 Se cases cited at note 128, supra.
'34 (1967), 180 Ct. Cl. 375.
135 Camp Moultrie Treaty. The Indians alleged inadequate consideration was
received under the terms of the treaty. To reach that issue the court had to first deter-
mine the extent of the ceded aboriginal claim in Florida. 180 Ct. Cl. at 378.
136 180 Ct. CI. at 383.
'37 Id. (citation omitted).
138 Id. at 384.
13 9 Id. at 384-85.
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Chehalis Tribe v. United States, 140 Ct. Cl. 192, 155 F. Supp. 226
(1957) ."..,,40
Nor did the Government's population figures impress the court: "the
Government leans far too heavily in the direction of equating 'occupancy'
(or capacity to occupy) with actual possession, whereas the key to Indian
title lies in evaluating the manner of land-use over a period of time. Physical
control or dominion over the land is the dispositive criterion."'141
The final test for aboriginal claims is that of time. While the courts have
not set a specific time period before a claim may be fairly stated, the outer
limits have been set by the decisions of the Court of Claims. In Confederated
Tribes v. United States, the court stated that the occupation "must be long
enough to have allowed the Indians to transform the area into domestic
territory so as not to make the Claims Commission Act 'an engine for creat-
ing aboriginal title in a tribe which itself played the role of conqueror but a
few years before' ",.142 On the other hand, the court in Seminole concluded
that occupation for 50 years was sufficient "as a matter of law" to satisfy the
"long time" requirement for Indian title. 43
While the legal tests for aboriginal claims are relatively easy to state,
enormous difficulties are encountered in proving these typically ancient
rights. In attempting to cope with this problem, the Claims Commission and
Court of Claims relies upon whatever expert, documentary and testimonial
evidence can be brought to bear. Thus the expert testimony of historians,
archeologists, anthropologists and ethnologists are frequently resorted to in
these cases. In addition, the testimony of tribal leaders relative to tribal
history and based upon oral accounts handed down from father to son from
time immemorial, has been permitted. 44 Finally, historical accounts, the
journals of early trappers and hunters and official documents comprise
another source of evidence in the establishment of aboriginal claims. 45
This review of the American law of aboriginal rights indicates a rather
fully developed judicial and legislative consideration of the problem of
original Indian title. At this point, we may turn our attention to the situation
in Canada. In our analysis of the Canadian experience, we are somewhat
impeded by a certain sparsity of judicial development on this question. It
may be this apparent lack of Canadian case law which has caused the current
Government of Canada to question the viability of aboriginal rights. A
consideration of Canadian political history and those judicial rulings which
do exist on this subject, and a comparison of these authorities with similar
developments in the United States, will however conclusively demonstrate
that aboriginal rights exist in Canada and are entitled to the same respect
that other property rights are uniformly given in the Dominion.
140Id. at 385.
141Id. at 385-86.
142 177 Ct. C1. at 194.
143 180 Ct. CI. at 387.
144 See, e.g., Pueblo De Zia v. United States, 165 Ct. CI. at 504.
145 See, e.g., Confederated Tribes v. United States (1966), 177 Ct. C1. 184, 198.
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III ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN CANADA
A. Origins and Recognition of Aboriginal Rights.
The origins of aboriginal rights in Canada is a far more contentious
issue than in the United States, where the rule of Johnson v. McIntosh is
uniformly conceded. The most frequently cited source of aboriginal title in
Canada is the Royal Proclamation of 1763.146 While the Proclamation also
created boundaries for the provinces of Quebec, East and West Florida and
Grenada and dealt with the issue of immigration, a most important part of
the document is the announcement of a new policy on Indian affairs.147
In brief, the Proclamation reserves "for the use" of the several "Nations or
Tribes of Indians with whom we are connected" all the lands not included
within the limits of Quebec, East and West Florida, or the territory of the
Hudson's Bay Company. Further, the chief executive of each colony was for-
bidden from granting any patent for lands beyond the bounds of his respective
territory. Such lands, "not having been ceded to or purchased by" the Crown,
were "reserved to the said Indians." Persons who had settled on Indian lands
were ordered removed and private individuals were prohibited from making
direct purchases of Indian territory. If however, "the Indians should be
inclined to dispose of (their) Lands ... " the land could be purchased only
by the Crown.
The Proclamation of 1763 is the formalized culmination of more than
a decade of British efforts and practices in dealing with the Indians. The
history of Indian affairs in British North America reveals that as early as
1754, the British determined that both a uniform Indian policy was a neces-
sity throughout the colonies148 and that the major component of that policy
was to be respect for Indian lands. 149 This latter view is revealed in the pre-
146 R.S.C. 1952, vol. VI, p. 6127. The precise date of the Proclamation is October
7, 1763. Those portions of the Royal Proclamation dealing with Indian lands are
reproduced as an Appendix hereto and all quoted references to the Proclamation are
contained therein. Virtually every Canadian case discussing aboriginal rights has
acknowledged that the Royal Proclamation is a source of aboriginal rights, though
there is disagreement whether it is the exclusive source of those rights.
147 "The first thought of the framers was to allay the alarms of the Indians,
and the articles, concerned with Indian relations, from the core of the document and
of its policy." Alvord, The Genesis of the Proclamation of 1763 (Michigan Pioneer
and Historical Society, 1908) 22.
148 "England had allowed, up to (the 1750's), each of the colonies to manage its
own relations with the Indians, with the result that there was ... irregularities in dealings
with the tribes, a total lack of unity in policy, and consequently a failure to hold the
Indians in friendship, made all the more evident by the success of the centralized
system of the French.
This was the problem which the Board of Trade undertook to solve in 1754. For
this purpose they called in that year the famous congress of delegates at Albany."
Alvord, supra note 147 at 24. See also Regina v. St. Catharines Milling Co. (1885D,
10 O.R. 196, 206; Native Rights in Canada, supra note 4 at 34-50.
149 In his dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in St.
Catharines Milling v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577, Mr. Justice Strong described
crown policy as being one which "sufficed to protect the Indians in the absolute use
and enjoyment of their lands ... " This policy he states, represents "an accurate des-
cription of the principles upon which the crown invariably acted with reference to
Indian lands, at least from the year 1756, when Sir William Johnson was appointed
by the Imperial Government superintendent of Indian affairs in North America, being
as such responsible directly to the crown through one of the Secretaries of State, or
the Lords of Trade and Plantation, and thus superseding the Provincial Governments,
down to the year 1867 ... " Id. at 608.
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Proclamation correspondence of Lord Egremont, Secretary of State for the
Southern Department, an important office in the control of colonial affairs:
[I]t may become necessary to erect some Forts in the Indian Country, with their
consent, yet His Majesty's Justice and Moderation inclines him to adopt a more
eligible Method of conciliating the Minds of the Indians by the Mildness of His
Government, by protecting their Persons and Property and securing to them all
the Possessions, Rights and Privileges they have hitherto enjoyed, and are entitled
to, most cautiously guarding against any Invasion or Occupation of their Hunting
Lands, the Possession of which is to be acquired by fair Purchase only.150
The Proclamation then, served to clarify and promote the pre-existing policies
of the British government.
The Proclamation of 1763 has the force of a statute in Canada and has
never been repealed. 151 Frequently denominated the "Charter of Indian
Rights", the precise meaning of the Royal Proclamation has generated so
much controversy as to further obfuscate an already inordinately complex
subject.
An important question relative to the Royal Proclamation involves a
dispute over its geographic scope.152 While there is judicial opinion to the
contrary, 15 3 several cases have held that the Proclamation does not apply
to the far North or West, such being "terra incognita" in 1763. 54 It is far
beyond the scope and competence of this article to resolve this dispute and
no such attempt will be undertaken.
Another very important question pertaining to the Proclamation of 1763
is whether it represents the exclusive source of aboriginal rights in Canada.
By its assumption that prior to declaration the Crown had to obtain Indian
lands by cession or purchase, 55 the Proclamation itself clearly recognizes the
pre-existing land rights of native people. In a statement in St. Catharines
Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen 56 however, the Privy Council
150 Cited in Native Rights in Canada, supra note 4 at 37 (emphasis added). The
original letter is dated May 5, 1763. Note the remarkable similarity in the description
of colonial attitudes toward Indian lands by Lord Egremont and Mr. Justice McLean
in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. at 392. See text and accompanying note 73, supra.
In a speech given to the Queen from the Senate and House of Commons of Canada on
the admission of Rupert's Land and the Northwest Territory into Confederation in 1870,
it was declared: "[T]he claims of the Indian tribes to compensation for lands required
for purposes of settlement will be considered and settled in conformity with the equitable
principles which have uniformly governed the British Crown in its dealings with the
aborigines. Reprinted in R.S.C. 1952, vol. VI, at 6243 (emphasis added).
151 Rex v. McMaster (Lady), [1926] Ex. C.R. 68, 72; Campbell v. Hall (1774),
1 Cowp. 204, 98 E.R. 1045.
152The Proclamation reserves to the Indians "all the Lands and Territories lying
to the Westward of the Sources of the Rivers which fall into the Sea from the West
and North West ..."
153 See the opinion of Norris, J.A., in Regina v. White and Bob (1964), 52
W.W.R. 193, 218-29 (B.C.C.A.).
154 See, e.g., Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia (1971), 13 D.LR.
(3d) 64; (1970), 74 W.W.R. 481 (B.C.C.A.); Regina v. White and Bob 52 W.W.R.
at 199 (Sheppard, J.A., dissenting); Regina v. Sikyea (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150
(N.W.T.C.A.).
255 The opening paragraph of that part of the Proclamation dealing with Indians
provides that the Indians "should not be molested or disturbed, in the Possession of such
Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by
us, are reserved to them ..."
150 (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46.
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seemed to imply that the Royal Proclamation constitutes the sole source of
aboriginal rights:
Whilst there have been changes in the administrative authority, there has been
no change since the year 1763 in the character of the interest which its Indian
inhabitants had in the lands surrendered by the treaty. Their possession, such as
it was, can only be ascribed to the general provisions made by the royal procla-
mation in favour of all Indian tribes then living under the sovereignty and pro-
tection of the British Crown.157
In the St. Catharines case, the Indian land in question was clearly
within the geographic purview of the Royal Proclamation. 158 Obviously then,
the character of that land could be ascribed only to that document. The
Privy Council had no occasion to nor did it rule on whether the Proclamation
represented the exclusive source of aboriginal title throughout the Dominion.
It was sufficient that on the facts before the Board, the Proclamation was
controlling. St. Catharines Milling therefore cannot be regarded as holding
that aboriginal rights depend exclusively upon the Proclamation of 1763.
Assuming arguendo however that the Proclamation is the exclusive source of
aboriginal rights in Canada, and accepting for the moment the view that the
Proclamation is limited geographically, 159 one wonders what land rights inure
to native people who reside outside the region professedly contemplated by
the Proclamation of 1763. Is it seriously contended that there are two rules
respecting the seminal issue of whether aboriginal rights are recognized in
Canada at all? It is submitted that the history of British colonial policy to-
ward the Indians and the overwhelming weight of Canadian case law on this
point negate any such view. To the contrary, a strong case can be made that
the law of aboriginal rights applies throughout Canada and that in those areas
not covered by the Proclamation of 1763, the source of those rights is the
law of nations, now incorporated into the common law of Canada. And
whether the derivation of aboriginal rights be regarded as the Royal Proc-
lamation of 1763 or the law of nations, 60 the incidents of Indian title are
precisely the same.
The proposition that aboriginal rights exist independently of the Royal
Proclamation has received judicial approval. In a series of cases involving
Indian hunting rights, Canadian courts have expressed the view that aboriginal
rights apply throughout the Dominion notwithstanding the Royal Proclama-
tion's geographic limits. Perhaps most forthright in this position was the late
Mr. Justice Sissons of the Territorial Court of the Northwest Territories. In
Regina v. Koonungnak,161 the court stated:
This proclamation has been spoken of as the 'Charter of Indian Rights.' Like so
many great charters in English history, it does not create rights but rather affirms
old rights. The Indians and Eskimos had their aboriginal rights and English law
has always recognized these rights.
Similarly, in Regina v. Sikyea,162 Mr. Justice Johnson, speaking for a unani-
mous Northwest Territories Court of Appeal, held that while the Royal
157 Id. at 54.
158 A full discussion of the facts of the St. Catharines case appears in the text
accompanying notes 169 to 172, infra.
159 This assumption will be made for the remainder of this article.
160 As described in Johnson v. McIntosh and its progeny.
161 (1963), 45 W.W.R. 282, 302.
162 (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150, afd [1964] S.C.R. 642.
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Proclamation did not extend to either the western Northwest Territories or
the Hudson's Bay Territory, "that fact is not important" since the Federal
Government had always respected the aboriginal rights of "all Indians across
Canada.' 0 3 The Sikyea court expressed approval of the 1932 decision in
Rex v. Wesley'6 4 in which a similar view of aboriginal rights was taken.
Not only the courts, but the executive and legislative branches of the
Governments of Canada and Great Britain have repeatedly acknowledged
the existence of aboriginal rights throughout Canada. Thus, in the 1869 deed
of surrender for Rupert's Land, it is stated:
14. Any claims of Indians to compensation for lands required for purposes of
settlement shall be disposed of by the Canadian Government in communication
with the Imperial Government; and the (Hudson's Bay) Company shall be
relieved of all responsibility in respect of them.65
In addition, various Dominion Lands Acts have given express recog-
nition to aboriginal rights and acknowledge the need to satisfy claims arising
from the extinguishment of Indian title.16 6 Further recognition of the Indians'
aboriginal rights is found in the 1943 Memorandum of Agreement between
the Government of Canada and the Government of British Columbia.167
While these cases and governmental documents have affirmed the exist-
ence of aboriginal claims throughout Canada, they have not fully addressed
themselves to the origins of these claims.
Several opinions from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
the St. Catharines Milling 10 case put forth the view that the law of aboriginal
rights described in the early American cases is equally applicable to Canada.
St. Catharines Milling involved a dispute between the Province of
Ontario and the Government of Canada as to the ownership of certain
163 Id. at 152. The court further stated: "The right of Indians to hunt and fish
for food on unoccupied Crown lands has always been recognized in Canada - in the
early days as an incident of their 'ownership' of the land, and later by the treaties by
which the Indians gave up their ownership right in these lands." Id.
164 [1932] 2 W.W.R. 337, 350 (Alta. S.C.). The conclusions and reasoning of the
court in Rex v. Wesley were adopted by Mr. Justice Freedman in Regina v. Prince
C_1962), 40 W.W.R. 234, 242, whose decision was adopted in turn by the Supreme
Court of Canada (subnom. Prince v. Regina), [1964] S.C.R. 81. See also Attorney-
General v. George, [1964] 2 O.R. 429, 432-33, reversed on other grounds, [1966]
S.C.R. 267.
1605 Reprinted in R.S.C. 1952, vol. VI, at 6254. As noted, the court in Regina v.
Sikyea (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150, 152, held that the Royal Proclamation did not
apply to the Hudson's Bay Territories. The quoted provision thus constitutes govern-
mental recognition of aboriginal rights in an area not covered by the Royal Proclama-
tion.
1661n the 1872 Public Lands Act, for example, section 42 states: "None of the
provisions of this Act respecting the settlement of Agricultural lands, or the lease of
Timber lands, or the purchase and sale of Mineral lands, shall be held to apply to
territory the Indian title to which shall not at the time have been extinguished." S.C.
1872, c. 23. A thorough discussion of the many other instances of legislative acknow-
ledgement of aboriginal title appears in A. Hooper, Aboriginal Title - Has It Been
Extinguished in the Northwest Territories?, 42-46, 109-16. A part of this exhaustive
study has been reproduced in Native Rights in Canada, supra note 4, at Supp. Report II.
167 "Whereas from time to time treaties have been made with respect to the personal
and usufructuary rights to territories now included in the Province of British Columbia,
such considerations including the setting apart for the exclusive use of the Indians
of certain definite areas of land known as Indian Reserves . . ." S.C. 1943-44, c. 19.
108 St. Catharines Milling v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577.
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lands ceded by the Salteaux Tribe of Ojibway Indians in an 1873 treaty with
the Dominion. The Province claimed ownership of the lands by virtue of
section 109 of the British North America Act. That section guarantees pro-
vincial ownership of all lands lying within the boundaries of the respective
provinces, subject to any trusts or other interests in those lands.169 The
Dominion claimed that by virtue of the Proclamation of 1763, the content of
aboriginal title to lands reserved for Indians was that of fee simple.170 As
such, the Dominion urged that it received the complete title as a result of the
treaty. Both the Supreme Court of Canada and the Privy Council held in
favor of the Province. The Privy Council ruled that as a result of the Royal
Proclamation, the ownership of Indian lands was split, with the Crown hold-
ing the underlying legal fee and the Indians possessing a right of occupancy,
termed a "personal and usufructuary right" by the Board.17' At Confed-
eration, said the Board, the Crown in right of the Province became possessed
of the proprietary estate and this became a plenum dominium upon the
surrender of the Indian title.1'72
It is immediately obvious that the nature of Indian title described by
Lord Watson in St. Catharines Milling is closely analogous to that described
by Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson v. McIntosh. Indeed, Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall expressly relied upon the Royal Proclamation as an additional
ground for his judgment in the McIntosh case.'73 In a review which dwelled
upon the explanation for this parallelism of aboriginal rights in the two
countries, Mr. Justice Strong in the Supreme Court of Canada offered some
keen insights into the origins and nature of Indian title. While Mr. Justice
Strong dissented from the Supreme Court's primary holding in St. Catharines
Milling, his views on Indian title are entirely consistent with those expressed
by the Privy Council.
Mr. Justice Strong viewed the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court as reflecting the consistent policy of the British Government toward
Indian lands.174 Based on these decisions, he summarized that policy "as
consisting in the recognition by the crown of a usufructuary title in the
Indians to all unsurrendered lands."' 7 5 After quoting extensively from the
169 "All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the several Provinces
of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick at the Union and all Sums then due or
payable for such Lands, Mines, Minerals, or Royalties, shall belong to the several
Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick in which the same are
situate or arise, subiect to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest
other than that of the Province in the same." Section 109, British North America Act,
1867, 30-31 Vict. c. 3.
170 (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46, 54.
171Id. at 54-55.
1
7 2 Id. at 55, 57.
173 "The proclamation issued by the king of Great Britain, in 1763, has been con-
sidered, and we think, with reason, as constituting an additional obiection to the title of
the plaintiffs." 21 U.S. at 262. The Proclamation was further discussed in Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. at 546-447.
1
74 "[We must refer to historical accounts of the policy already adverted to a'
having been always followed by the crown in dealings with the Indians in respect of
their lands.
In the Commentaries of Chancellor Kent and in some decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States we have very full and clear accounts of the policy in question."
(1887), 13 S.C.R. at 607-08.
175 Id. at 608.
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American cases discussed in Part II(A) of this paper, Mr. Justice Strong
concluded:
Therefore, when we consider that with reference to Canada the uniform practice
has always been to recognize the Indian title as one which could only be dealt
with by surrender to the crown, I maintain that if there had been an entire
absence of any written legislative act ordaining this rule as an express positive
law, (i.e. the Royal Proclamation of 1763), we ought, just as the United States
courts have done, to hold that it nevertheless existed as a rule of the unwritten
common law, which the courts were bound to enforce as such ...176
Mr. Chief Justice Ritchie, writing a majority opinion for himself and
Mr. Justice Fournier, held that the crown possessed legal title to unpatented
lands, subject to the Indian right of occupancy. 177 His authority for this
proposition was Mr. Justice Storey, an American jurist who wrote exten-
sively on aboriginal title in the United States.z78
Recently, Mr. Justice Norris, in Regina v. White and Bob,170 reviewed
the decision in Johnson v. McIntosh and concluded: "The judgment of the
learned chief justice is entirely consistent with the opinion of the Privy
Council in St. Catharines Milling & Lumber Co. v. Reg ...-"0 Mr. Justice
Norris also concluded that the Proclamation of 1763 was "declaratory and
confirmatory" of aboriginal rights. 1'
Finally, the discussion in Johnson v. McIntosh makes clear that its
theories were not peculiar to the United States but rather were the result
of colonial policies applicable to all of North America. 82
The growing number of Canadian decisions holding that aboriginal
title applies throughout Canada lends strong support to the argument that
aboriginal rights pre-date the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and survive as
common law in those parts of the Dominion not reached by the Proclamation.
The only authority opposing these views has come in a recent decision
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal. In Calder v. Attorney-General
of British Columbia,8 3 the court held that not only did the Royal Proclama-
tion of 1763 not extend to British Columbia, but that there can be no
170 Id. at 613.
'77 Id. at 599.
178 Id. at 600. It is noteworthy that in attempting to describe the extent of abor-
iginal rights, in the St. Catharines case, Chancellor Boyd in the Ontario High Court and
each of the judges in the Ontario Court of Appeal relied upon American authorities,
particularly Johnson v. McIntosh. See (1885), 10 O.R. 196, 209 (Boyd, C.); (1886),
13 O.A.R. 148 (Hagarty, CJ.O.), 159 (Burton, J.A.), 168 (Patterson, J.A.).
170 (1964), 52 W.W.R. 193 (B.C.C.A.).
180 Id. at 212.
1811d. at 218.
182 See 21 U.S. at 595 for a full discussion of British policies toward Indians in
North America. After citing the early aboriginal rights decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Strong in St. Catharines Milling stated: The value and
importance of these authorities is not merely that they show that the same doctrine as
that already propounded regarding the title of the Indians to unsurrendered lands pre-
vails in the United States, but, what is of vastly greater importance, they without excep-
tion refer its origin to a date anterior to the revolution and recognize it as a continuance
of the principles of law or policy as to Indian titles then established by the British gov-
ernment, and therefore identical with those which have also continued to be recognized
and applied in British North America." (1887), 13 S.C.R. at 610.
183 (1971), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 64, (1970), 74 W.W.R. 481 (B.C.C.A.).
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judicial recognition of aboriginal fights absent legislative or executive
"recognition" of such title. 8 4
Calder was an action for a declaration that the aboriginal rights of the
plaintiff Indians had never been extinguished. The action was brought by
the Nishga Indian Tribe, who reside in the Nass Valley of British Columbia.
It was common ground that the Nishga Indians had inhabited a large area
in northwestern British Columbia since time- immemorial. It was revealed
at trial that the Nishgas numbered about two thousand in 1835 and had
traditionally subsisted by hunting and food gathering. 1es
Before dealing with the issue of extinguishment, the Court of Appeal
took occasion to incorporate the British "Act of State" doctrine into Cana-
dian Indian law, an entirely novel and unprecedented step. The court's re-
view of the Act of State doctrine led it to the conclusion, proposed by the
respondent Attorney-General, that there "is no Indian Title capable of
judicial recognition in the courts of Canada unless it has previously been
recognized either by the Legislature or the Executive Branch of Govern-
ment."' 8
6
To support this proposition, the court cites Privy Council cases dealing
with colonial situations from Pondoland to India. It may at first be ob-
served that it seems curious that the court should strain to utilize cases
arising out of a now discredited imperialist era and from geographically
and culturally remote regions, to reach a conclusion antonimic to that of
Canadian and American tribunals. But the court's employment of the Act
of State doctrine in Calder involves far more than what is arguably a poor
choice of law. For it is apparent that the Calder court has misconstrued
the Act of State doctrine itself.
Absent a contrary rule of municipal law, the Act of State doctrine
denies a remedy to the citizens of an acquired territory for invasions of
their rights which may occur during a change of sovereignty. 8 7 As noted,
the action in Calder was for a declaratory judgment. Neither damages nor
any other form of enforcement for plaintiff's alleged rights were sought. A
mere declaration that such rights exist and had not been extinguished was
all that plaintiffs asked. It is clear that the 'Act of State' doctrine represents
nothing more than a procedural bar to the enforcement of rights in the
municipal courts. Each of the cases cited by the court in Calder so state.188
184 13 D.L.R. at 73, 74 W.W.R. at 491. After disposing of the Royal Proclama-
tion under the "terra incognita' doctrine, the court had little difficulty in not finding
other legislative or governmental recognition. There are, of course, no treaties with
the Nishgas or with most other Indians in British Columbia.
185 13 D.L.R. at 70, 74 W.W.R. at 487. The evidence was introduced by Professor
Wilson Duff, an anthropologist testifying as an expert witness.
186 Id.
187 See, e.g., Vajesingji Joraversingji v. Secretary of State (1924), 51 Ind. App.
375, 360-61 (P.C.); Cook v. Sprigg, [1889] App. Cas. 572, 577-79 (P.C.); D.P.
O'Connell, supra note 30 at 437.
188 See, e.g., Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v. Aotea Dist., [1941] App. Cas. 308, 324:
"It is well settled that any rights purporting to be conferred by such a treaty of cession
(Treaty of Waitangi) cannot be enforced in the courts, except in so far as they have
been incorporated in the municipal law." (emphasis added); Secretary of State v.
Kamachee Boye Sahaba (1859), 13 Moore 22, 86, 15 E.R. 9, 33: "It is sufficient to
say that, even if a wrong has been done, it is a wrong for which no municipal court
of justice can afford a remedy." (emphasis added).
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This has been made explicit by Professor D. P. O'Connell in his treatise,
International Law:
This doctrine, which has been affirmed in several cases arising out of the acqisi-
tion of territory in Africa and India, has been misinterpreted to the effect that mu
substantive rights themselves have not survived the change. In fact English courts
have gone out of their way to repudiate the construction, and it is clear that
the Act of State doctrine is no more than a procedural bar to municipal law
action, and as such is irrelevant to the question whether in international law
change of sovereignty affects acquired rights.189
By holding that there is no Indian title capable of judicial recognition
without a governmental edict to that effect, the Calder court effectively nulli-
fied plaintiffs legal rights by incorrectly converting a procedural impediment
into a substantive rule of law.
Without the procedural bar of the Act of State doctrine, what is the
English rule regarding private (including communal) property in acquired
lands? In Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary,190 the appellant was head chief
of the Oluwa community in Southern Nigeria. As such, he controlled the
communal lands on behalf of the members of his community. The issue in
the case involved the basis of calculating the compensation to be awarded
for the taking of appellant's lands under the Public Lands Ordinance of 1903.
In reviewing the appellant's land holdings, the Supreme Court of Nigeria
ruled that appellant had "merely a seigneurial right giving the holder the
ordinary rights of control and management of the land" and that compen-
sation was to be limited to that basis.191 In his appeal to the Privy Council,
appellant urged that compensation be based on the full value of the com-
munal property.
The Public Lands Ordinance provided for compensation in cases of a
taking of lands for public purposes. The case thus falls within the "recog-
nition" exception to the Act of State doctrine. That the Ordinance did not go
to the substantive recognition of native title is demonstrated by the Court's
expressed need "to consider, in the first place, the real character of the native
title to the land.' 92 In the course of its judgment, the Privy Council noted
that the usufructuary right was a "very usual form of native title" and that
"[tiheir Lordships have elsewhere explained principles of this kind in con-
nection with the Indian title to reserve lands in Canada."'198 In Lagos, a
cession of the land to Great Britain resulted in the Crown's possession of
'89 D. P. O'Connell, supra note 30 at 437-38 (citations omitted). That the Act of
State doctrine in no way affects substantive rights is also made clear in Cook v. Sprigg,
[1899] App. Cas. 572, 578, a case heavily relied upon by Mr. Justice Tysoe in Calder:
"It is no answer to say that by the ordinary principles of international law private
property is respected by the sovereign which accepts the cession and assumes the duties
and legal obligations of the former sovereign with respect to such private property
within the ceded territory. All that can be properly meant by such a proposition is
that according to well-understood rules of international law a change of sovereignty
by cession ought not to affect private property, but no municipal tribunal has authority
to enforce such an obligation."
190 [1921] 2 App. Cas 399 (P.C.).
101 Id. at 402.
192 Id.
10a Id. at 403. The Court referred to the decision in St. Catharines Milling. As
expressly stated in St. Catharines Milling, reserve lands refer to all lands reserved for
Indians, not merely "Indian reserves". (1888), 14 App. Cas. at 59.
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the legal fee. But, said the Board, "this cession (of the fee) appears to
have been made on the footing that the rights of property of the inhabitants
were to be fully respected. This principle is a usual one under British policy
and law when such occupations take place."194 Following previous deci-
sions,195 the Board ruled that in light of this policy there is a general pre-
sumption in favor of the continuance of property rights of the native inhabi-
tants.196  The appellant was therefore awarded full value for his land.'
97
This policy, of course, is in full conformity with the rule of international law
respecting property rights in acquired territory.198 It is also consistent with
the Canadian policy of respect for aboriginal lands and with those cases
holding that aboriginal rights exist in all parts of the Dominion irrespective
of statutory recognition. 199
The conclusion seems compelling that at least with respect to the
"recognition" of aboriginal title, the decision in Calder v. Attorney-General
of British Columbia represents a substantial deviation from Canadian, English
and American case law and governmental policy, and is therefore erro-
neous.
2 00
B. The Content of the Aboriginal Claim.
In the St. Catharines Milling case, the Privy Council found it necessary
to discuss the nature of Indian title in order to resolve the issues before it.
In construing the Royal Proclamation, the Board found that aboriginal
'94 [1921] 2 App. Cas. at 407 (emphasis added).
195 Attorney-General of S. Nigeria v. Holt, [1915] App. Cas. 599; Oduntan Onisiwo
v. Attorney-General, [1912] 2 Nig. L.R. 77.
196 [1921] 2 App. Cas. at 407. "[lt is not admissible to conclude that the Crown is
generally speaking entitled to the beneficial ownership of the land as having so passed
to the Crown as to displace any presumptive title of the natives. A mere change in
sovereignty is not to be presumed as meant to disturb rights of private owners..."
Id. See also Re South Rhodesia, [1919] App. Cas. 211, 233-34.
197 [1921] App. Cas. at 411.
198 See D.P. O'Connell, supra note 30.
199 See discussion at notes 161 to 164 and accompanying text, supra. "[TMhis proc-
lamation (of 1763), ever since its issue, has been faithfully observed in its integrity,
as well within the limits of the then Province of Quebec as in all other... British pos-
sessions in North America." St. Catharines Milling v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. at
652 (Gwynne, J., dissenting). Moreover, correspondence between the Colonial Secretary
and Governor Douglas of British Columbia reveal the same policy of respect was to
apply to the Far West. Thus in a letter dated April 11, 1859, the Colonial Secretary let
the Governor know that the British Government desired that "measures of liberality
and justice may be adopted for compensating" the Indians for the surrender of their
lands on Vancouver Island and British Columbia. Cited in Calder v. Attorney-General
of British Columbia, 13 D.L.R. at 85, 74 W.W.R. at 505. That such a policy was not
ultimately carried out was solely due to a lack of funds and not because of any change
in policy. See correspondence, 13 D.L.R. at 86-87, 74 W.W.R. at 506-08.
200 In reviewing the Calder case, the writer has concentrated upon the judgment
of Mr. Justice Tysoe. The opinion of Mr. Justice Davey concentrates primarily upon
the Act of State doctrine and is an abbreviated concurrance of the opinion by Mr.
Justice Tysoe. Mr. Justice MacLean quotes extensively from Johnson v. McIntosh and
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States. The learned Justice then contends that while the
recognition - non-recognition dichotomy in Tee-Hit-Ton went to the issue of compen-
sation, the same rules should apply to a declaration of recognition. Mr. Justice Mac-
Lean offers no support for this extraordinary conclusion. Certainly none can be ex-
tracted from any American case, including Tee-Hit-Ton. While that case weakened
aboriginal claims against the government, the Court expressly acknowledged the legal
existence and protection of "unrecognized" aboriginal title. 348 U.S. at 279.
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title consisted of "a personal and usufructuary right, dependent upon the
good will of the Sovereign."'201
There is little doubt but that the latter phrase was used by the Privy
Council to denote the Crown's exclusive right to extinguish Indian title and
thereby merge the Indians' beneficial use with the legal fee held by the Sov-
reignty. 20 2 Quoting the Proclamation of 1763, the Board held that Indian
lands "shall be reserved for the use of the Indians, as their hunting grounds
" . .t203 Unfortunately the Board declined the opportunity to define with
precision the nature of the Indian right.204 Moreover, the lack of Canadian
case law on this subject has left us with almost no judicial opinion as to the
character of aboriginal title, and, more particularly, as to the meaning of a
"usufructuary right". The most complete statement has been by Mr. Justice
Strong in his opinion in St. Catharines Milling:
It may be summarily stated as consisting in the recognition by the crown of a
usufructuary title in the Indians to all unsurrendered lands. This title, though not
perbaps susceptible of any accurate legal definition in exact legal terms, was one
which nevertheless sufficed to protect the Indians in the absolute use and enjoy-
ment of their lands, whilst at the same time they were incapacitated from making
any valid alienation otherwise than to the crown itself, in whom the ultimate
title was ... considered as vested.2 05
This description comports with the modem legal definition of a usufruct,
a term derived from Roman law.2 06 It is also consistent with the American
rule of aboriginal rights and with those Canadian cases which have adopted
or approved the American rule. While Canadian judicial authority on this
point is sorely lacking, the authority we do have would seem to support the
view that the aboriginal rights of Canadian Indians includes the right to hunt,
farm and exploit the natural resources on the lands which they possess. Any
governmental encroachment upon such lands (e.g. the granting of leases to
private corporations to mine natural resources) would of course constitute
a partial extinguishment.207
As to the primary right to hunt, there is little doubt. The Royal Proc-
lamation expressly so provides and a number of Canadian cases have held
201 (1888), 14 App. Cas. at 54.
202 In the same paragraph Lord Watson noted: "It appears to (their Lordships)
to be sufficient for the purposes of this case that there has been all along vested in the
Crown a substantial and paramount estate, underlying the Indian title, which became a
plenum dominium whenever that title was surrendered or otherwise extinguished." Id.
at 55. See also Native Rights in Canada, supra note 4 at 156-57.
203 (1888), 14 App. Cas. at 55.
204 'There was a great deal of learned discussion at the Bar with respect to the
precise quality of the Indian right, but their Lordships do not consider it necessary to
express any opinion upon the point." Id.
205 (1886), 13 S.C.R. at 608 (emphasis added).
2003The usufruct has developed as a form of trust, often created by will. It is still
employed in countries such as South Africa which derive their law of property from
Roman law. A South African text thus describes the right: "Usufruct created by will
is therefore the bequest of the use of a thing with the right to take and keep its fruits
during the duration of the usufruct." H.R. Harlo and E. Kahn, South Africa, The
Development of its Laws and Constitution (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1960) 634;
see Native Rights in Canada, supra note 4 at 155-56.
207There can of course be a partial expropriation of property and the rules re-
garding compensation in such a case are the same as in the case of a complete taking.
G. Challies, The Law of Expropriation (Montreal: Wilson and Lafleur Ltd., 1963) 80.
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that the right to hunt is an incident of aboriginal rights. 208 Restrictions upon
this right would also have to be considered a violation of the aboriginal title
and therefore a partial extinguishment.
This review indicates that the nature and content of aboriginal title
is similar in both Canada and the United States. As stated earlier, this is
undoubtedly the result of the common legal heritage of the right. This
common heritage will also be of assistance in understanding the law of
extinguishment of aboriginal title in Canada.
C. Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title.
Both the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and St. Catharines Milling make
clear the uninhibited and exclusive right of the sovereign to extinguish
aboriginal title2 09 Until the 1970 decision in Calder v. Attorney-General of
British Columbia however, no Canadian case had attempted to explain how
such an extinguishment could be executed.
A preliminary issue on the subject of extinguishment concerns itself
with possession of the power under scrutiny. Prior to Confederation, the
power to extinguish Indian title resided in the colonies, subject to British
approval. By virtue of section 91(24) of the British North America Act,
the Dominion has now been given exclusive legislative authority over
"Indians, and lands reserved for the Indians". Such an explicit delegation
would unquestionably seem to carry with it the sole authority to extinguish
Indian title.
21 0
In Calder, the British Columbia Court of Appeal was asked to declare
that the aboriginal title of the Nishga Indians had not been extinguished.
After an elaborate review of pre-Confederation legislation, the court con-
cluded that if there ever had been aboriginal title in British Columbia, it
had surely been extinguished by such legislation.211 As noted, Calder repre-
sents the only elaborated judicial statement on the law of extinguishment in
Canada. The Court of Appeal chose to rule on this subject by restating and
adopting American law. To do this, the court took selected quotations from
United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad212 and Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States.21 3 The effect of these adopted judicial statements is that an
extinguishment may be accomplished bY any means convenient to the sov-
ereign, including the "sword, by purchase, by the exercise of complete
dominion adverse to the right of occupancy, or otherwise . . .,,214 and that
208See, e.g., Regina v. Sikyea (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 150, 152, aff'd [1964]
S.C.R. 642; Rex v. Wesley, [1932] 2 W.W.R. 337, 348-50. See also Lysyk, TheUnique Constitutional Position of the Canadian Indian (1967), 45 Can. B. Rev. 513,
518. 209 In St. Catharines Milling, Lord Watson commented that Indian title subsisted
until "that title was surrendered or otherwise extinguished." 14 App. Cas. at 55.21o See generally Lysyk, supra note 208; cf. Rex v. McMaster (Lady), supra note
151. 211 The court referred to some thirteen legislative acts or proclamations. These
enactments generally dealt with the pre-emption of unoccupied Crown lands and were
designed to throw open the colony to settlement. 74 W.W.R. at 508-17.
212 (1941), 314 U.S. 339.
213 (1954), 348 U.S. 272.
214 314 U.S. at 347. Cited in Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia,
13 D.LR. at 79, 74 W.W.R. at 497.
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the equity of such an extinguishment is not open to judicial review. While
this is undoubtedly an accurate review of American law to the extent that it
goes, it nevertheless represents only part of the law of extinguishment. As
the discussion in Part II (C) demonstrated, courts in the United States (in-
cluding the Supreme Court in the Santa Fe case) require very strong evidence
to rebut the presumption against an extinguishment of aboriginal title.215 This
presumption arose as a result of the history of official obeisance toward
aboriginal rights in the United States. If anything, the history of respect for
Indian land rights is far stronger in Canada than in the United States, where
violent deviations from official policy were notorious. If the American rule
of extinguishment is to be applied in Canada, then a similar presumption
against extinguishment of original Indian title should follow.216
Whether or not Indian title has been extinguished in any particular
jurisdiction requires a careful and extensive review of pertinent legislative
(and executive) history.217 All we can do here is provide the theoretical
perspective from which such an analysis can proceed. The history of Canada
demonstrates the traditional seriousness which the Crown maintained toward
Indian rights. While the sovereign undoubtedly has had the authority to
extinguish Indian title, the law and consistent political history in this area
show that an extinguishment cannot be lightly implied.
In those instances where an extinguishment of aboriginal rights has
occurred, the question finally remains whether such a loss is compensable.
D. Compensation for the Taking of Aboriginal Lands.
Although not called upon to do so, the Court of Appeal in Calder v.
Attorney-General gratuitously offered its view on the issue of compensation
in cases of extinguishment. Unlike its discussion of "recognition", where the
court rejected American authorities in favor of the British Act of State
doctrine, here the court declared:
[W]hatever may be the situation in this regard in relation to natives in some other
part of what was once the British Empire, in my opinion whatever rights the
Indians in British Columbia possessed which have not been specifically recognized
... may be extinguished by the Crown without compensation and without the
consent of the Indians, just as is the case in the United States.218
215 See discussion at notes 73 to 75 and accompanying text, supra. In Lipan
Apache Tribe v. United States (1967), 180 Ct. Cl. 487, 492, the United States Court
of Claims recently restated this area of law: "While the selection of a means is a
governmental prerogative, the actual act (or acts) of extinguishment must be plain
and unambiguous. In the absence of a 'clear and plain indication' in the public records
that the sovereign 'intended to extinguish all of the [claimant's] rights' in their property,
Indian title continues." (citation omitted). Accord, United States v. Northern Paiute
Nation, 393 F. (2d) 786, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1968).21GIn Lipan Apache, the Court of Claims also held that the mere existence of
legislation which potentially could annul aboriginal title was insufficient to effect an
extinguishment. Thus legislation by the Republic of Texas to remove the Indians "as
soon as circumstances permit" could not affect Indian title. Held the Lipan court: "We
cannot declare, however, that the contemplation of possible future action contingent on
other circumstances is clear evidence of present extinguishment." 180 Ct. Cl. at 494.
217 See, e.g., A. Hooper, supra note 166. See also Calder v. Attorney-General of
British Columbia, 13 D.L.R. at 79-98, 74 W.W.R. at 498-522.
218 13 D.L.R. at 80, 74 W.W.R. at 498.
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The court of course referred to Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States.219 The court's reliance upon this case is unfortunate for several
reasons. Unlike those Indian rights decisions derived from international
law and British colonial policy, Tee-Hit-Ton is based upon an interpretation
of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a peculiarly
American enactment. The Calder court did not so much as mention the
presumption against expropriation without compensation, which constitutes
the relevant Canadian authority on this question.220
In addition, Tee-Hit-Ton was decided at a time when compensation
for the vast majority of Indian claims was being made, albeit through a
statutory arrangement. It was therefore inaccurate for the court to state
that unrecognized Indian claims may be extinguished without compensation
in the United States. Only those unrecognized claims not within the purview
of the Indian Claims Commission Act are non-compensable, and these
represent but a tiny minority of the American cases.22'
The pertinent legal authority on compensation for loss of property
rights is well established: "[T]he general rule of law in expropriation cases
is and has long been that compensation is given, and any statute providing
for expropriation without compensation must be expressed in the clearest
and most unequivocal terms. '2 22 This rule, of course, has been consistently
followed by English and Canadian courts.223
In Calder v. Attorney-General, the court assumed for purposes of its
discussion of the law of extinguishment and compensation that the Indians
had a personal and usufructuary right to their lands.224 It has been shown
that while Indian title may be extinguished, it most definitely contains the
legal incidents of private rights. Canadian law recognizes the applicability
of the presumption against expropriation without compensation to owners of
many forms of interest in property, aside from the fee simple. Indeed, at
least one case has applied the rule to the possessor of a usufruct. 225 While
the question has yet to be squarely faced by a Canadian court, there seems
little reason why this presumption should not be as fully applicable to
aboriginal title as it is to other forms of private right.
219 (1955), 348 U.S. 272.
220The omission is even more surprising in view of the full discussion on this
point presented in plaintiff's factum. See Factum for Plaintiff at 42-44, Calder v.
Attorney-General of British Columbia (1971), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 64, (1970), 74 W.W.R.
481.
2 2 1 See discussion at notes 122 to 126 and accompanying text, supra.
2 2 2 G. Challies, supra note 207 at 77.
223 See, e.g., Metropolitan Asylum Dist. v. Hill, [1881] 6 App. Cas. 193, 203, 208;
British Columbia Elec. Railway v. Public Utilities Comm'n, [1960] S.C.R. 837, 845-46;
Leahy v. North Sydney (1905-06), 37 S.C.R. 464, 476.
224 13 D.L.R. at 79, 74 W.W.R. at 497.
225 Commissaires d'Ecoles v. Charbonneau, [1953] Que. S.C. 477. "The owner of
any property or of any interest in any property can claim compensation if the property
or any interest therein is expropriated.
Compensation is awarded not only to the owner of the land but to the owner of a
servitude, or to a licensee... or to a usufructuary." G. Challies, supra note 207 at 73
(citations omitted).
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While Canadian Indians may thus fairly state a substantive claim for
compensation for the unconsented deprivation of their aboriginal rights, the
procedural impediments to such a claim appear to be formidable. Without
legislative intervention, procedural rules such as statutes of limitations and
Crown immunity would seem fatal to any action except one for a declaratory
judgment.
IV CONCLUSION
It has been the purpose of this article to refute the notion that native
people have not a legal claim to their aboriginal lands, but merely a moral
or ethical one. That they have the latter is irrefutable. But two centuries
of political and judicial decisions conclusively demonstrate an outstanding
substantive right as well.
Aboriginal rights evolved in both Canada and the United States from
the respect accorded native lands by the colonizing powers, particularly Great
Britain. It is therefore no coincidence that the theory of aboriginal rights has
developed along the same lines in both nations. It is also more than mere
chance that leading American decisions have referred to the Royal Proc-
lamation of 1763 and leading Canadian decisions have referred to the early
American jurisprudence, in tracing the origins and nature of original Indian
title.
Judicial precedent in Canada and the United States reveal that impor-
tant legal rights exist as incidents to aboriginal title. The attempt to enforce
those rights against the government led to a stormy judicial debate in the
United States. The ensuing embarrassment to the American people was
ameliorated by the enactment of legislation designed to right old wrongs by
fair and efficacious means. The Canadian rule on similar claims has yet to
be litigated.
What remains important for Canadians is that both the legal and moral
right to the recognition of aboriginal claims undeniably exists. How those
claims are to be protected and satisfied, must ultimately be determined by
the Government and native peoples of Canada.
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APPENDIX
Excerpts from the Royal Proclamation of 1763.*
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the security
of our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are
connected, and who live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in
the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been
ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them or any of them, as their Hunting
Grounds-We do therefore, with the Advice of our Privy Council, declare it to be our
Royal Will and Pleasure, that no Governor or Commander in Chief in any of our
Colonies of Quebec, East Florida, or West Florida, do presume, upon any Pretence
whatever, to grant Warrants of Survey, or pass any Patents for Lands beyond the
Bounds of their respective Governments, as described in their Commissions; as also
that no Governor or Commander in Chief in any of our other Colonies or Plantations
in America do presume for the present, and until our further Please be Known, to
grant Warrants of Survey, or pass Patents for any Lands beyond the Heads or Sources
of any of the Rivers which fall into the Atlantic Ocean from the West and North West,
or upon any Lands whatever, which, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us as
aforesaid, are reserved to the said Indians, or any of them.
And We do further declare it to be Our Royal Will and Pleasure, for the present
as aforesaid, to reserve under our Sovereignty, Protection, and Dominion, for the use
of the said Indians, all the Lands and Territories not included within the Limits of Our
Said Three New Governments, or within the Limits of the Territory granted to the
Hudson's Bay Company, as also all the Lands and Territories lying to the Westward
of the Sources of the Rivers which fall into the Sea from the West and North West as
aforesaid;
And We do hereby strictly forbid, on Pain of our Displeasure, all our loving
Subjects from making any Purchases or Settlements whatever, or taking Possession of
any of the Lands above reserved, without our especial leave and Licence for that
Purpose first obtained.
And, We do further strictly enjoin and require all Persons whatever who have
either wilfully or inadvertently seated themselves upon any Lands within the Countries
above described, or upon any other Lands which, not having been ceded to or
purchased by Us, are still reserved to the said Indians as aforesaid, forthwith to remove
themselves from such Settlements.
And Whereas Great Frauds and Abuses have been committed in purchasing Lands
of the Indians, to the Great Prejudice of our Interests, and to the Great Dissatisfaction
of the said Indians; In order, therefore, to prevent such Irregularities for the future, and
to the End that the Indians may be convinced of our Justice and determined Resolution
to remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent, We do, with the Advice of our Privy
Council strictly enjoin and require, that no private Person do presume to make any
Purchase from the said Indians of any Lands reserved to the said Indians, within those
parts of our Colonies where, We have thought proper to allow Settlement; but that, if
at any Time any of the said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the said Lands,
the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our Name, at some public Meeting or
Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that Purpose by the Governor or Com-
mander in Chief of our Colony respectively within which they shall lie; and in case they
shall lie within the limits of any Proprietary Government, they shall be purchased only
for the Use and in the name of such Proprietaries, conformable to such Directions and
Instructions as We or they shall think proper to give for that Purpose; And We do, by
the Advice of our Privy Council, declare and enjoin, that the Trade with the said
Indians shall be free and open to all our Subjects whatever, provided that every Person
who may incline to Trade with the said Indians do take out a Licence for carrying on
such Trade from the Governor or Commander in Chief of any of our Colonies res-
pectively where such Person shall reside, and also give Security to observe such Regula-
tions as We shall at any Time think fit, by ourselves or by our Commissaries to be
appointed for this Purpose, to direct and appoint for the Benefit of the said Trade:
And We do hereby authorize, enjoin and require the Governors and Commanders
in Chief of all our Colonies respectively, as well those under Our immediate Govern-
ment as those under the Government and Direction of Proprietaries, to grant such
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Licences without Fee or Reward, taking especial care to insert therein a Condition,
that such Licence shall be void, and the Security forfeited in case the Person to whom
the same is granted shall refuse or neglect to observe such Regulations as We shall
think proper to prescribe as aforesaid.
And We do further expressly enjoin and require all Officers whatever, as well
Military as those Employed in the Management and Direction of Indian Affairs, within
the Territories reserved as aforesaid for the Use of the said Indians, to seize and
apprehend all Persons whatever, who standing charged with Treason, Misprisions of
Treason, Murders, or other Felonies or Misdemeanors, shall fly from Justice and take
Refuge in the said Territory, and to send them under a proper Guard to the Colony
where the Crime was committed of which they stand accused, in order to take their
Trial for the same.
Given at our Court at
St. James the 7th Day
of October 1763, in the
Third Year of our Reign.
GOD SAVE THE KING
*Reprinted in R.S.C. 1952, Vol. VI at 6130-31.
